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ABSTRACT

This study examines the changing relationship between parliament and the
Crown during the Tudor monarchies. When Henry VIII broke from the Roman
Catholic church in 1533, he created a contradiction in the theory o f Tudor monarchy;
he gained the authority of an imperial king at the price o f dependence on parliament.
Though he regarded parliament as a tool to facilitate his imperial quests for territorial
autonomy and a male heir, Henry’s expedient inclusion of parliament in state matters
proved problematic for his children.
Unwilling to accept what they considered the imprudent decisions o f a minor
and two female monarchs, the men o f parliament increased their interference in the
royal succession during the reigns o f the later Tudors. By analyzing John Aylmer’s
1558 treatise, An Harborowefor Faithfull and Trewe Subjects, and Elizabethan
parliamentary records, among other contemporary sources, I contend that the
escalating conflict between parliament and the Crown was not inevitable or
conspiratorial but rather a response to circumstances by men bound to counsel their
female sovereign.

PARLIAMENT AND THE
TUDOR SUCCESSION CRISIS

INTRODUCTION

In 1533, Henry VIII divorced Catherine o f Aragon, who had failed to produce
a male heir, and married Anne Boleyn. In order to secure this divorce, which was
prohibited by canon law, and remarry, Henry declared his independence from Rome;
he claimed that his realm was an empire and as such, subject to no higher jurisdiction
than the King himself. To Henry’s disappointment, his second wife also bore only a
female child. In his quest for a male heir, Henry divorced and remarried several more
times, passed four separate succession acts, and wrote a last will and testament that
alternately bastardized his daughters and placed them in line for the throne. In 1547
Edward VI, Henry’s long-hoped-for son, became the king o f England as a minor. On
his deathbed several years later, he and his Protestant counselors conspired to place a
Protestant heir on the throne in place o f his Catholic sister Mary; despite these
machinations, Mary inherited the throne in 1553. In order to ensure that England
would remain Catholic, Mary married Philip o f Spain, hoping to produce an heir who
would prevent the accession o f the Protestant princess Elizabeth. During her short
reign, Mary experienced only a false pregnancy, and Elizabeth became queen in 1558.
Against all expectations, Elizabeth obdurately refused to marry or otherwise settle the
succession, effectively reversing her father’s desperate policy to provide a male heir.
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These events, in brief, comprise the Tudor succession crisis. Religion, a royal
minority, and considerations o f gender clearly complicated this series o f crises, as did
the legislative participation o f the men who sat in parliament. What role did
parliament play in these events, and more importantly, how did the succession crisis
change the relationship between parliament and the crown? In this paper, I will
endeavor to answer these questions, paying particular attention to Henry VIII’s
legislative revolution and the early years of Elizabeth I’s queenship. These same
questions have perennially occupied Tudor political scholars, creating a lengthy and
often contentious historiographical debate that I will outline as a point o f departure for
my own analysis.
In 1953, in his Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, J. E. Neale proposed a
decidedly Whiggish version o f Tudor-Stuart parliamentary history. Working
backward from the research o f his colleague, Wallace Notestein, Neale sought to find
the catalyst for parliament’s bold “initiative” during the reigns o f the Stuart kings.1
Beginning with the reign o f Henry VIII, according to Neale, parliament steadily and
inevitably progressed to the predominant status it achieved under the Stuarts. Most
significant was Neale’s argument that, like their Stuart successors, Tudor parliaments
gained influence through calculated opposition in the House o f Commons. Neale
contended that, by taking advantage o f its expanded legislative role in Henry’s
divorce proceedings, “parliament arrogated to itself the functions o f a court... on its
own initiative.”2 In regard to Mary’s reign, Neale recognized the influence o f gender

1Norman Jones, “Parliament and the Governance o f Elizabethan England: A Review,” Albion 19 (Fall
1987): 327.
2 J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments. 1559-1581 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), 17, 19.
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on interactions between the men in parliament and their female sovereign. Mary’s
female status unleashed what he called “the critical, combative instincts of sixteenthcentury mankind,” making Mary’s brief reign an “apprenticeship for [parliament’s]
future greatness.”3
Though Henry’s divorce and Mary’s gender had opened the door for
parliamentary ascendance, Neale found the greatest evidence of Stuart-type conflict
during Elizabeth’s reign. Reading between the lines of parliamentary proceedings,
Neale postulated the existence of a forty-three-man Puritan ‘choir’ in the Commons
who, through “concerted preparation,” sought to further their own agenda at the
expense o f the queen.4 He identified this group on the basis o f a pamphlet entitled “A
Lewd Pasquil Set Forth by Certain o f the Parliament Men.” This group of religiouslydriven men, he said, “were set on coercing their Sovereign.”5 Neale perceived this
resistance primarily in terms of religion, but he considered conflict over the
succession an additional indication of parliament’s long-term conspiracy to wrest
sovereignty from the monarch.
Neale also suggested that parliament’s persistent refusal to accept Elizabeth’s
succession policies was related to her gender, a point not missed by Elizabeth herself.
In his words, “Elizabeth was right: they would not have dared to treat her father so.
The regiment o f a woman displayed its inherent weakness.”6 Neale argued that
Elizabeth’s rejection of parliament’s counsel encouraged the men of parliament to
increase their opposition from what it had been under her father’s reign, thus

3 Ibid., 21.
4 Ibid., 421.
5 Ibid., 134.
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hastening the “evolution” of an independent parliament.7 This evolution was
epitomized by Peter Wentworth, who accused the queen of abrogating parliament’s
right to free speech through her command that the men of parliament cease discussion
on her succession. Neale categorized Wentworth’s actions as the “dawn of a new age;
harbinger o f Stuart conflicts.”8
In response to Neale’s thesis, G. R. Elton blatantly asserted that “all the talk of
the rise of Parliament as an institution into political prominence is balderdash.”9
After undermining Neale’s presumptive evidence in support of a self-serving Puritan
choir, and chastising him for anachronistically explaining Tudor politics in terms of
Stuart conflict, Elton contended that Tudor parliaments were in fact apolitical
institutions. That is, parliament was called by the monarch to pass legislation, an
activity that occupied the vast majority of its time in comparison to the brief
discussions of political issues that Neale emphasized.10 Furthermore, far from being
an independent counterbalance to monarchy, parliament was wholly dependent on the
Crown for its very existence. In Elton’s words, if parliament “did stop a powerful
executive from becoming an absolutist monarchy, it did so not by forming a
counterpoise to the Crown but by assisting the Crown in lawful government.”11
Despite their fundamental disagreement on the evolution and business of
parliament, Elton and Neale agreed that parliament had experienced a revolution

6 Ibid., 142.
7 Ibid., 421.
8 Ibid., 152.
9 G. R. Elton, The Parliament of England. 1559-1581 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986),
378.
10 G. R. Elton, “Parliament in the Sixteenth Century: Functions and Fortunes,” The Historical Journal
22 (1979): 258.
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during Henry’s reign. To Elton’s mind, the Henrician revolution of the 1530s did not
portend parliament’s rise to autonomy but rather signaled the extension of
parliament’s legislative purview into spiritual as well as temporal matters. In this
sense, argued Elton, the Henrician Reformation could be considered a milestone in
the history o f law; for all Henry’s claims concerning the divine origin of his supreme
headship, his religious reformation was carried about by parliamentary statute, not the
law o f God. The common law, created by the joint body of the king-in-parliament
through statute, therefore triumphed over its long-time rival, canon law.12 In
comparison to Neale’s oppositional framework, Elton thus emphasized the
cooperation between king and parliament in constructing the statutory basis of the
Reformation, an event that augmented both o f their statures.
Crucially, Elton perceived no change between the Henrician and Elizabethan
parliaments, apparently ignoring or discrediting Neale’s suggestion that the gender of
the monarch influenced the relationship between parliament and the Crown.
According to Elton, “no significant development occurred to take either the whole
body or the Commons further along the road to new initiatives or a new
independence... further, that is, from the position attained in [Henry’s] Reformation
Parliament.”13 Though he refused to recognize any shift in parliament’s role between
the two reigns, Elton could not avoid the evidence of political conflict during
Elizabeth’s early queenship. He explained this phenomenon not in terms of

11 Elton, Parliament o f England. 378. Quoted by Dale Hoak in his review o f Elton’s book in the
American Historical Review (June 1988), 686.
12 G. R. Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix: The Triumph o f Parliamentary Law in the Sixteenth Century,” in
The Parliaments o f Elizabethan England, eds. D. M. Dean and N. L. Jones (Oxford, 1990), 16, 29.
13 Elton, “Fortunes,” 277.
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parliament’s evolution but rather as the result of parliamentary management by
factions of the privy council. When their own admonitions to the queen regarding her
marriage and the succession proved unsuccessful, Elton suggested that the “Privy
Council used the Parliament to augment their pressure on her.”14 Far from exercising
their independent authority, Elton therefore argued that the members o f parliament
were little more than sometime mouthpieces of more significant advisors.
Elton’s emphasis on cooperation between monarch and parliament, marred
only by the scheming of privy councilors, had been widely adopted by the 1980s and
replaced Neale’s conflict thesis. In 1985, Michael Graves described Elizabeth’s
parliaments as “not political, seeking to limit or obstruct the crown, but rather co
operative ventures in legislation,” while Jennifer Loach asserted that conflict between
Mary and her parliaments was only infrequent, for consensus politics characterized
that reign.15 Though Neale’s portrayed Mary’s tenure as a crucible o f organized
resistance, Loach concluded that “what seems at first glance to be formed opposition
turns on closer scrutiny into an ephemeral and largely coincidental association.”16
Since the 1980s, however, Elton’s cooperative account of parliament and
Tudor monarchs has lost its hegemonic hold on the historiography. Though his
argument for harmony between Crown and parliament during Henry’s monarchy
remains viable, some revisionists have found his assertion untenable for Elizabeth’s

14 Elton, Parliament of England. 374. As explained by Jones, Elton considered parliament a secondary
arena for the discussion of politics, employed by the queen’s councilors when the normal channels of
political debate, the court and council, were “clogged.” See “Parliament and the Governance of
Elizabethan England,” 333-334.
15 Michael A. R. Graves, The Tudor Parliaments. Crown. Lords and Commons. 1485-1603 (London:
Longman, 1985), 127.
16 Jennifer Loach, Parliament and the Crown in the Reign of Mary Tudor (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986,) 201.
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early reign. These scholars have begun to challenge what they see as the artificial
dichotomy represented by Neale’s usurping parliament and Elton’s apolitical
institution. As explained by T. E. Hartley, it is possible to identify political conflict
between queen and parliament without embracing Neale’s notion of oppositional
ascendance or Elton’s dependence on factional intrigue.17
Conflict and resistance, according to Maria-Victoria de la Torre and Stephen
Alford, were widespread among the members o f parliament during the first decade of
Elizabeth’s reign. As argued by de la Torre, male MPs considered their succession
policies superior to Elizabeth’s stalling tactics because she was a woman and
therefore less capable of ruling than a man. In de la Torre’s scholarship, Neale’s
contention that gender influenced Mary’s and Elizabeth’s relationships with their
parliaments has enjoyed a resurgence. De la Torre examines the gender assumptions
of Elizabethan culture and suggests that Elizabeth’s female sex motivated her MPs to
mitigate and influence her sovereignty in ways that were inappropriate when a male
occupied the throne. Because she was a woman, male MPs believed that she
“required the intervention o f men to help make the proper choices.”

1 ft

Though her

parliaments may have preferred to cooperate with their queen as they had with her
father, Elizabeth’s refusal to fulfill her dual duties as woman and monarch and secure
the succession motivated parliament to increase their opposition to her policies.19 As
explained by de la Torre, “while not self-consciously attempting to usurp power from

17 T. E. Hartley, Elizabeth’s Parliaments: Queen. Lords, and Commons. 1559-1601 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992), 2, 7.
18 Victoria-Maria de la Torre, “Sex, Subjugation, and the Succession: Gender and Politics in Early
Elizabethan England” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1997), 209.
19 Ibid., 434, 444.
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the Crown and alter the political structure, MPs were responding to circumstances,...
but in doing so, the manner of their involvement suggests a greater level of
interference with the Crown, now worn by a woman.”20
For de la Torre, the relationship between Crown and parliament was
profoundly changed by Elizabeth’s gender. Though parliament had taken part in
Henry’s succession policies by turning his will into law, its participation under
Elizabeth was no longer of the rubber-stamp variety.21 Through succession tracts and
parliamentary petitions, the men of parliament actively resisted and attempted to
influence the policies of their queen. Elizabeth’s womanhood and her refusal to
accept the counsel o f her male MPs thus undermined the cooperative enhancement of
power that had characterized the interactions between Henry and his parliaments.
Henry’s dependence on parliament’s legislative authority to buttress his imperial
sovereignty, his “marriage of convenience” as Neale termed it, became quite
inconvenient for his younger daughter. As queen instead of king, she did not receive
the loyal obedience of her MPs but rather their loyal advice, advice that she was
expected to heed.
According to Alford, those MPs who proffered their guidance were not
puppets or independent-minded revolutionaries, but men bound to counsel their
apparently wayward female monarch. Alford asserts that the men of parliament and
the privy council shared the same outlook on the queen’s marriage and the

20 Ibid., 262-3.
21 Ibid., 242.
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succession.

22

MPs needed no prompting to proclaim their opinion that the queen was

endangering the safety of the realm by remaining unwed and leaving the succession
unsettled. Far from being controlled by privy councilors, the men who sat in the 1566
parliament acted against the advice o f principal secretary Cecil when they brazenly
introduced a bill to determine the succession without the queen’s blessing.23
Alford suggests that the MPs’ actions were motivated by expectations based
on gender, a previous minority, and the rhetoric o f counsel. In his words, “the impact
on the English polity of two female monarchs, and the experience o f governing the
kingdom during the reign of a minor... were reinforced by a literature of European
conciliarism.”24 This discourse o f counsel sprang from a humanist-classical model
that emphasized the duty of an active citizen to participate in his republic.25
Elizabethan conciliarists, led by William Cecil, redefined themselves as subjects who
were bound to advise their sovereign. Though he “accepted the culture o f Tudor
imperialism,” Cecil perceived England as a mixed polity instead of a simple
monarchy. That is, “he believed that the queen’s imperium was limited by the advice
of her councilors in [the privy] council and in parliament.”26 When the men of
parliament encouraged the queen to marry and secure the succession, they were

22 Stephen Alford, The Early Elizabethan Politic: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis,
1558-1569 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 98.
23 Norman Jones, The Birth of the Elizabethan Age (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 146.
24 Alford, 210. Though he does express their interdependence very clearly in this statement, Alford
does not thoroughly explore the interaction between gender and the rhetoric o f counsel in the early
Elizabethan polity.
25 For a full discussion o f the humanist-classical roots and expressions o f the discourse o f counsel see
John Guy, “The Henrician Age” in The Varieties o f British Political Thought. 1500-1800. ed. J. G. A.
Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).; John Guy, “The Rhetoric of Counsel in Early
Modem England,” in Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995).
26 Alford, 7, 210.
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carrying out their conciliar duties. But, Elizabeth’s consistent rebuffs frustrated these
men who followed the credo o f counsel stipulating “action not based on knowledge
was worthless and knowledge wasted without resulting action.”27
Alford argues that Elizabeth’s treatment of the succession as a private matter
o f her imperium and her corresponding refusal to act on her counselors’ advice
compelled Cecil and parliament to consider other alternatives to stabilize the
succession. The most radical o f these alternatives was contained in a clause drafted
by Cecil in 1563 but never introduced to the queen. Cecil contended that through
statute, parliament could invest the power to choose the next monarch in a royal
council if the queen should die without issue. In effect, this clause would separate
royal imperium from the person o f the monarch. To conciliarists like Cecil, the duty
to preserve the polity superseded the dictates o f the queen herself.28
Alford interprets Cecil’s proposal for a “counciliar interregnum” as evidence
o f republican thinking in a monarchical context.29 But, like de la Torre, he does not
perceive a long-term conspiracy among MPs and privy councilors to wrest
sovereignty from their monarch. Instead, they merely responded to the immediate
threat of Elizabeth’s succession policies which, they believed, endangered the safety
of the English nation. To Alford, the succession was the determinant issue in the
relationship between Elizabeth and her councilors during her early reign, a
relationship characterized by political conflict rather than Henrician harmony. In his
words, “Elizabeth’s refusal even to allow the Lords and Commons to debate the

27 Ibid., 33.
28 Ibid., 116.
29 Ibid., 117.
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future o f the kingdom encouraged MPs and councilors to consider alternatives, to
plan independent action, and to disobey the queen.”30
De la Torre’s 1997 doctoral dissertation and Alford’s book, published in 1998,
represent some of the freshest insights on parliament’s role in the early Elizabethan
succession crisis. In this paper, I join them in the project of releasing Elizabeth’s
parliaments from Elton’s apolitical muzzle. To their persuasive arguments that
gender and conciliarism underpinned the conflict between queen and parliament, I
wish to add the precedential factor o f Henry VIII’s dependence on parliament for his
divorce and succession legislation. The break from Rome established Tudor imperial
kingship, but the legislative component o f the revolution was carried out by the
authority o f the king-in-parliament, not the king alone. Therefore, as John Guy
asserts, the Henrician revolution created a “binary opposition” between imperium and
consilium in the theory o f Tudor monarchy, the same opposition that Alford detects in
Elizabeth’s reign.31 In the first chapter of this paper, I will explore the competing
discourses of imperial kingship and mixed sovereignty, as expressed in Henry’s
search for imperial precedents and Christopher St. German’s notion of the king-inparliament.
Despite the apparent opposition of these two theories, I believe that Elton is
correct in his assessment that Henrician relations between crown and parliament were
characterized by cooperation and mutual gain. This was the case primarily because
the men of parliament transformed Henry’s will into law without resistance. They

30 Ibid., 157.
31 John. Guy, “Tudor Monarchy and its Critiques,” in The Tudor Monarchy, ed. John Guy (London:
Arnold, 1997), 88-89; John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 133.
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assented to his multiple and often contradictory succession settlements, even granting
him the authority to alter hereditary descent through his last will and testament.
Henry required the legitimacy o f statute, which only parliament could offer, to carry
out his Reformation and succession policies and thus had no choice but to extend
parliament’s legislative purview into spiritual and royal matters.32 Therefore,
parliament had much to gain by endorsing Henry’s policies. In the first chapter, I will
discuss Henry’s inclusion o f parliament in determining the succession, his vacillation
on the line o f succession, and the limiting effect of these decisions on the imperial
kinship o f his heirs.
As Henry’s children quickly discovered, once MPs had played a role in the
succession, it proved difficult to prevent them from discussing the issue. Less willing
to trust the judgment of minor and female monarchs, the men of parliament were no
longer content to give their uncritical assent but sought to directly influence royal
marriage and the succession. In the third chapter, I will discuss how minority and
gender thus brought to the fore the tension between imperium and consilium that had
remained dormant since the Henrician revolution. To demonstrate this tension in the
minds o f Tudor political theorists, I will analyze John Aylmer’s treatise, An
Harbor owe fo r FaithfulI and Trewe Subjects, written just prior to Elizabeth’s
accession. Like his Henrician predecessors, Aylmer argued that England was a mixed
polity, governed by the authority of the queen-in-parliament. In addition, he
introduced a second legal fiction to describe the relationship between the monarch
and the state: the queen’s two bodies. By separating Elizabeth’s fallible body natural

32 Elton, “Lex Terrae V ic tr ix 23.
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from her infallible body politic, it was possible for her counsellorsors to express
resistance to her allegedly inferior policies. This theory had significant gender
implications, as Elizabeth herself employed it to describe her superior body politic as
masculine in nature.
By applying the logic of conciliarism and separating the queen’s two bodies,
some of Elizabeth’s male counselors even went so far as to suggest that parliament
could determine the succession without the queen herself. Regarding this issue, I will
consider William Cecil’s abortive clause for an interregnum council to determine the
succession, John Hales’ 1563 tract encouraging his fellow parliamentarians to act in
the best interests of their country which, in this case, was against the queen, and
parliament’s attempt in 1566 to initiate succession legislation without the queen’s
approval. Though they all proved unsuccessful, in my opinion, these radical,
unprecedented proposals constitute definitive evidence that the relationship between
parliament and the Crown had changed from Henry’s to Elizabeth’s reign. Why
indeed had parliament, in a period o f thirty years, gone from playing no role in the
royal succession, to giving its consent through legislation, to resisting the queen’s
policies, and ultimately proposing to act independently o f the queen? The answer, I
believe, is related to both Henry’s and Elizabeth’s succession policies. Henry’s
expedient inclusion of the men of parliament in his religious and succession
legislation set the stage for their greater interference in state matters during the reigns
of his children. Elizabeth’s gender in general and her stubborn refusal to heed
counsel on the succession in particular, catalyzed the change.

CHAPTER ONE
Henry VIII: Building An Empire of Interdependence
King Henry VIII is perhaps best known for the personal and often selfish
power he wielded over his subjects. He carried out numerous and costly wars in an
effort to implement his imperialist claims, married and divorced wives as suited his
purposes, had himself declared a caesaropapist in the Act o f Supremacy (1534),
thereby placing himself rather than the Pope at the head o f the English church, and
established England as an empire with himself as emperor in the tradition of
Constantine. Yet, “the most willful king ever to sit on the throne o f England” also
compromised his absolute sovereignty by making parliament an essential and
permanent part o f the English government.33 Because the English Reformation that
made him imperial sovereign was carried out by means o f statute, Henry was
inherently dependent on parliament. This dependence led to a concurrent, mutual
expansion o f the authority o f both king and parliament. As Henry extended his royal
supremacy to encompass religious as well as temporal matters, parliament
simultaneously gained omnicompetence, in the sense that it could legislate for both
church and state alike.

33 G. R. Elton, “The Body of the Whole Realm: Parliament and Representation in Medieval and Tudor
England,” publication o f Jamestown Essays on Representation, ed. A. E. Dick Howard (Charlottesville:
University Press o f Virginia, 1969), 19; G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution. 2nd ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 234.
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The relationship between these two governing bodies was not one o f
competition for individual power, but rather cooperation for mutual benefit. The king
required the legal force o f parliamentary statute to achieve his Reformation while
parliament depended upon Henry’s supreme headship o f the Church o f England to
extend its legislative purview into spiritual issues. In order to carry out this dual
revolution, the previously distinct governing bodies of king and parliament became
the indivisible king-in-parliament. As Michael Graves succinctly asserts “it only
required the crisis o f the 1530s to transform this trinity into a mixed sovereign which
could deal, without restraint, in all aspects o f human affairs.”34
There is no doubt that the events o f the 1530s represent a crucial turning point
in the history o f parliament.35 However, the perceived significance o f the
Reformation renders historians particularly prone to the mythologies o f doctrine and
coherence as described by Quentin Skinner. Most relevant to Tudor-Stuart history,
Skinner warns against studying history with preconceived expectations based on
future events and shaping the potentially disparate actions o f an individual or
government into a coherent, conscious plan. Skinner’s “mythologies” have been
enacted by some Tudor historians, such as Neale, who have read the relationship
between Henry VIII and his parliament in terms o f a struggle between tyranny,
embodied in the former, and freedom, championed by the latter. Echoing Skinner, G.
R. Elton noted that because o f the pervasiveness o f this seventeenth-century “Whig”
paradigm, “parliament’s performance has been judged by the degree to which it

34 Graves, 58.
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approximated the ideal stereotype o f a counterbalance.”36 As this chapter will attempt
to demonstrate, this conclusion is anachronistic for Henry’s reign, when king and
parliament cooperatively exercised their mixed sovereignty as the king-in-parliament.
A second mythology in Tudor historiography treats Henry’s actions prior to
the Reformation as deliberate precursors to his policies in the 1530s. Basing his
conclusions on Henry’s insertion o f imperial ideas into his coronation promises,
Walter Ullman asserts that “the Act in Restraint of Appeals merely spells out in detail
what had been in Henry’s mind some twenty-four years earlier.”37 Though they are
less sweeping than Ullman, confining their conclusions to the years 1527-1533,
Graham Nicolson refers to Henry’s “consistent direction” and Virginia Murphy
characterizes Henry’s actions as a “coherent policy.”38 Historians such as John Guy,
Dale Hoak, and Thomas Mayer have avoided this mythology of coherence by pointing
out possible paralles but cautioning that Henry’s policies before the Reformation are
“too often read in anticipation o f the Act o f Appeals.”39 As Mayer succinctly states,

35 Elton, “Body of the Whole Realm,” 46. A true believer in the momentous role of the decade, Elton
states, “In the history of Parliament, as in so much else, the 1530s reset the stage upon which the
fortunes of England were playing themselves out.”
36 Ibid., 16; Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History o f Ideas,” History and
Theory 7 (1969): 11. In Skinner’s words, “the tendency to search for approximations to the ideal type
yields a form o f non-history which is almost entirely given over to pointing out earlier ‘anticipations’ of
later doctrines....”
37 Walter Ullman, “‘This Realm o f England is An Empire,”’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History 30
(1979): 184.
38 Graham Nicolson, “The Act of Appeals and the English Reformation,” in Law and Government
Under the Tudors, eds. Claire Cross, David Loades, and J. J. Scarisbrick (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 19; Virginia Murphy, “The Literature and Propaganda of Henry VIII’s First
Divorce,” in The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics. Policy, and Piety, ed. Darmaid MacCulloch (New
York, 1995), 136.
39 Dale Hoak, “The Iconography of the Crown Imperial,” in Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 101.
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“we know where Henry and the others were going, but he could not have, at least to
the same degree.”40

1. Imperial Kingship
With these caveats in mind, it is imperative to explore the intellectual
background o f the Act in Restraint of Appeals of 1533. We know from Graham
Nicolson’s discovery of the Collecteana Satis Copiosa that Thomas Cromwell did not
create the pregnant concept “this realm of England is an empire” at the time that he
composed the Act. Though Henry and Cromwell certainly used the assorted historical
precedents contained in the Collecteana as the foundation for Henry’s imperial
kingship, the Collecteana itself was compiled by Henry’s intellectual coterie.
Nicolson locates the unmistakable connection between the Collecteana and the Act of
Appeals in the numerous drafts of the Act.41 In the Act itself, the contents o f the
Collecteana underlie the opening phrase, “by divers sundry old authentic histories and
chronicles.”42 Therefore, based on Henry’s own obsession with precedent and the
manifest impact that it had on his policy, an investigation o f the precedents that
formed his idea of empire is in order 43

40 Thomas F. Mayer, “On the Road to 1534: the Occupation of Toumai and Henry VIII’s Theory of
Sovereignty,” in Tudor Political Culture, ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 30.
41 Nicolson, 23; Guy, Tudor England. 133. Guy shares Nicolson’s opinion stating, “the link between
the Act of Appeals and Collecteana satis copiosa is manifest - even more so if drafts of the act are
examined.”
42 The text o f the Act o f Appeals is replicated in Elton, Tudor Constitution. 353-358.
43 Nicolson, 20. At the same time that the Collecteana was being researched in England, Henry was
attempting to find evidence of England’s imperial status in the Papal archives of other European
libraries.
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According to Walter Ullman, the practices o f the Roman emperors directly
influenced Henry’s understanding of imperial kingship. In Ullman’s words, “Henry
conceived ‘the imperial crown’ as the sum-total of all the rights and functions which
the late Roman emperor had, hence rex who in his kingdom was imperator.” 44 These
rights o f the Roman emperors were based on the distinction between public and
private law as delineated by Ulpian, a quintessential Roman legal authority. The role
of the emperor was to control all things under the purview o f public law, which
encompassed the administration of both civil and ecclesiastic matters.
O f greatest import to Henry was Constantine’s execution of this law-based
role 45 Constantine had exercised his authority through calling and managing the
Council of Nicaea, assembled to determine theological doctrine on the Trinity. In his
actions at Nicaea, Constantine clearly distinguished between his right to control the
external workings o f the church, and issues of faith, which fell under the control of
religious authorities alone. Like Constantine, Henry did not wish to interfere in
interior, spiritual matters, but rather to rule the external affairs of the church.
Therefore, he found Roman exercise o f the public law “particularly suitable [indeed]
virtually tailored for the situation which [he] faced from about 1529 onwards.”46
Though the Roman Constantine had established the desired jurisdiction over
the church, it was in Sicilian precedent that Henry found substantiation for his claim
to territorial sovereignty. During the early sixteenth century, Henry’s Aragonese
father -in-law, Ferdinand, ruled over Sicily in both the ecclesiastical and temporal

44 Ullman, 198.
45 Ibid., 180-181.
46 Ibid., 179.
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senses. Furthermore, the Pope recognized Ferdinand’s headship over the church
within his realm. Ullman again infers that the example o f Ferdinand’s rule was
“tailored to suit the needs of his son-in-law” who no doubt was aware o f the extensive
powers exercised by the Aragonese kings in Sicily.47 Their prerogatives had just
received wide press in 1514 when Ferdinand had ordered a search of the Papal
archives for the records o f their territorial sovereignty. This search proved quite
successful, and the results were published in the Liber Monarchiae 48 The most
important document it contained was Urban II’s conferral o f the imperial role vicarius
Dei on the eleventh-century Norman conquerer of Sicily, Roger I. This papal decree
rendered the kings o f Sicily in all respects equal in authority to the Roman
emperors.49 Based on Ferdinand’s success in proving his imperial legitimacy, it is no
wonder than Henry adopted the same precedent-hunting tactics.50
To find further evidence o f historic imperial practices, Henry had to look no
farther than England itself.51 Dale Hoak identifies the “true architect o f the
symbolism o f Tudor ‘imperial’ kingship” as Henry VII, Henry the VIII’s father and
predecessor.52 In his efforts to buttress the legitimacy o f his rule, Henry VII
attempted to portray himself as an emperor equal in stature to the monarchs o f France
and Germany. To do so, he made extensive iconographic use o f the symbolically
powerful crown imperial worn by English monarchs. Hoak illustrates how Henry

47 Ibid., 189.
48 Though Ullman does not explicitly say so, his argument could be extended to support the idea that
this compilation may have served as a model for the Collecteana.
49 Ullman, 189.
50 Ibid., 190.
51 Bracton’s sentences, which were themselves included in the Collecteana, contained a justification of
English kings’ imperium within their own realm. See Nicolson, p. 23.
52 Hoak, 101.
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enshrined these crown-bearing images of himself on coins and greatly magnified the
perceived importance o f his crown imperial through woodcuts and art.

As John Guy

notes, it was also Henry VII who greatly diminished the status of the church during
his reign by means of crippling taxation and churchly appointments based on political
expediency rather than religious considerations.54
Based on Hoak’s and Guy’s characterization o f Henry VII, Henry VIII was in
many ways simply following in the imperial footsteps o f his father. Indeed as Hoak
concludes, “he [Henry VIII] had been taught to ‘see’ the symbolic meaning of the
closed [imperial] crown of England long before he changed his ‘jurysidiccion and
dignite ryall’ to a ‘crown or imperial jurisdiction.’”55 In other words, the image of
himself as an emperor had been inculcated into his self-consciousness at a very young
age, and therefore Henry always believed himself to possess the authority o f an
emperor in his own realm. In Ullman’s words, “it was this monarchic principle which
from his pre-coronation time down to the mid-1530s was in Henry’s mind. This was
the basis which inspired his opposition to papal jurisdiction.”56 As Virginia Murphy
put it, “his uncompromising position inevitably set him on a course of confrontation
with the papacy.”57
The first indication of friction between Henry’s imperialism and papal
jurisdiction came in 1510 in the French city o f Toumai. Upon conquering this French
territory, Henry assumed supremacy over both the lay and spiritual populations, an

53 Ibid., 65, 77.
54 Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 174.
55 Hoak, 103.
56 Ullman, 195.
57 Murphy, 158.
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authority that he did not similarly possess in his English kingdom. Thomas Mayer
asserts that the opportunity presented by Toumai proved to be the “mechanism by
which the arsenal o f [imperial] arguments became available to Henry and
Cromwell.”58 In other words, in Toumai Henry could effect Roman control of the
public law. He exercised this authority by bestowing Toumai’s bishopric on Cardinal
Wolsey, thereby increasing his own influence over the religious affairs of the region.
However, the Pope named a Frenchman, Louis Guillard, to the post apparently
without consulting Henry first and thereby nullifying his claim to final jurisdiction.
Henry’s indignation over this blatant affront to his “royal sovereignty” was aroused
and his rather bombastic letters to the Pope resulted in the return of the position to
Wolsey.59 The Pope at this time, Leo X, succumbed to Henry’s diatribe rather
unceremoniously, stating that he never intended to “encroach on Henry’s ‘maiestate et
amplitudine.’”60
In his Toumain argument against the Pope, Henry had clearly asserted two of
Guy’s three tenets o f “national sovereignty” that would underlie the king’s actions in
the 1530s: secular imperium and provincial self-determination.61 Henry’s choice to
oppose the Pope through a direct attack on his papal supremacy is also characteristic
of his policies in the 1530s. Though he most likely could have reinstated Wolsey by a
humble application to the Pope, the method that Wolsey himself advocated, Henry
chose to advance his sweeping claims o f independent power.

58 Mayer, 28.
59 Ibid., 19.
60 Ibid., 24.
61 Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 159.
62 Mayer, 19.
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Catherine o f Aragon could have been argued on equally conventional grounds, but
Henry again rejected this non-presumptive solution in favor of denying the Pope’s
power to dispense at all. Clearly, Henry was unwilling to compromise his “very high
view o f his kingship.”63 Guy argues that it was this unabashed “egoism” that
prevented Henry from procuring a divorce from Clement; “he sought a papal
annulment... for a reason humiliating to the papacy.”64 Though one Pope may have
yielded to Henry’s self-righteous claims of sovereignty in Toumai, Clement VII
would prove less subservient.
Mayer has argued for the key role that Toumai played in the development of
Henry’s imperialism, titling his chapter, “On the road to 1534...” and asserting that
“the case o f Toumai led Henry to take a long step toward the 1530s.”65 Though
Henry could not possibly have been basing his actions on what was to come, certain
similarities are evident between his policies in Toumai in the mid 1510s and those
concerning the divorce case in the 1530s. Mayer describes how Henry not only
claimed a greater jurisdiction over Toumai than he practiced in England but that he
“turned to some o f the same tools to enforce his sovereignty as would play integral
parts in the Tudor revolution, parliament and the common law.”66
Despite this convincing list of his imperialist tendencies, we must be careful
not to treat Henry’s actions as conscious precursors to the events of the 1530s.
Whether or not he did indeed harbor long-standing imperial intentions, the
redefinition o f England as an empire became politically expedient as the 1530s

63 Ibid., 11.
64 John Guy, Tudor Eneland. 117.
65 Mayer, 30.
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unfolded. Both Murphy and Ullman cite Henry’s aging wife and lack of a male heir
as the most immediate catalysts for his actions.67 Like the exercise o f territorial
sovereignty, establishing a secure succession was essential to Henry’s concept of
strong imperial kingship. As Ulman notes, “for Henry, the public interest demanded a
male successor.”68 His failure to produce the necessary male heir “weighed heavily
on [Henry’s] mind” at the close of the 1520s, as did his growing affection for Anne
Boleyn.69
Henry expressed his concerns over his marriage with Catherine in Henricus
Octavius, the most significant of a series of “little books” which embodied the king’s
*1A

stance on the divorce issue.

Though Henry probably did not compose the majority

of the book, he certainly was involved in its compilation. The argument presented by
the book was founded on the biblical passage from Leviticus that forbade a man from
marrying his brother’s wife on penalty of “childlessness.”71 Believing his current
marriage to be cursed, Henry desired another in which he could legitimately produce
sons. He further claimed that no marriage of this type could be dispensed by papal
authority because it transgressed the law of God. If the Pope at this point had
conceded that his predecessor’s dispensation had been unfounded and granted Henry
an annulment, Henry’s desire for a divorce and his imperialistic views may never
have converged. However, when Henry realized that the Pope was unwilling to

66 Ibid., 16-17.
67 Ullman, 178; Murphy, 148.
68 Ullman, 179.
69 Ibid.
70 For a fuller discussion of Henricus Octavius and the logic behind Henry’s divorce from Catherine
see Murphy, “The Literature and Propaganda of Henry VIII’s First Divorce.”
71 According to Murphy, Henry’s coterie was able to translate the phrase without children as without
sons by referring to the Hebrew rather than the Latin scripture. See p. 139.
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cooperate, England’s potential imperial status presented itself as the solution to
Henry’s “great matter.”
Where before, Henry’s scholars had been concerned with validating his claim
for divorce, they now began to concentrate on substantiating the king’s jurisdiction
over spiritual affairs, no doubt with one particular affair in mind. Murphy asserts that
in the spring o f 1531 the printing of the Censurae academiarum, a much expanded
revision o f Henricus Octavius, demonstrated this new direction. Founded on the
same Levitican injunction, the Censurae encouraged bishops actively to resist
wrongful dispensations on the part of the papacy. According to Murphy, this book
implied that “the government was considering taking practical steps in England to
achieve the divorce.”

The episcopal resistance posited by the Censurae coincided

well with the imperial jurisdiction afforded Henry by the Collecteana, which he first
saw in late 1530. If England was indeed an empire possessed o f spiritual sovereignty,
and if bishops were required to overturn the “misguided” views o f the papacy, then
the divorce case could conceivably be decided in England itself.

2.

The King-in-Parliament

In order to create his empire, enact his divorce, and provide a male heir, Henry
needed the statutory legitimacy that was attainable only through parliament. Up to
this point I have made little mention o f parliament’s role in the events o f Henry’s
reign before the 1530s. I chose to do so in order to demonstrate the intensely personal

72 Murphy, 155-157.
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nature o f Henry’s imperial kingship. Though he certainly employed the intellectual
efforts of others, he was an active force in the establishment of policy in England, and
he directed this policy toward the aggrandizement of his own power and influence.
The most prominent features of his policies were his obsession with imperialism and
his belief in his own divinely-ordained supremacy. This view of his royal power, I am
quite sure, left no room in the political equation for parliament.
As established by the Act of Appeals (1533) and the Act of Supremacy (1534),
Henry was indeed the supreme head of church and state. Parliament theoretically
played no part in the origination of the king’s supremacy, only acknowledging those
powers that God had bestowed on him.74 However, in point of fact, the English
Reformation was as much a result o f parliamentary legislation as it was of God’s will.
As explained by Elton, Henry’s “dignity as supreme head he owed to God and God’s
law; the reality o f his powers as supreme head he owed to the common law,” as
enacted by parliament.

Unlike those emperors of Rome with whom he wished to

compare himself, Henry did not possess sole legislative sovereignty. Instead, he
required the cooperation o f his Lords and Commons to establish the laws of his
empire.

Therefore, if Henry wanted his personal supremacy to be recognized in law

and enforceable in the courts o f the land, he had no choice but to enlist parliament’s
assistance in his imperial reformation.

73 Guy, Tudor England. 129. Guy asserts that as a “theocratic king” Henry could “summon the bishops,
or an English church council, to pronounce his divorce, and then enforce their decision by proclamation
or act o f parliament.”
74 Elton, Tudor Constitution. 342.
75 Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix, ” 25.
76 Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix, ” 22.
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Though Henry himself may have viewed parliament as an expedient tool to
accomplish his imperial ends, Thomas Cromwell, his chief minister, recognized
parliament’s potential to limit Henry’s absolutism.77 As stated by Guy, “Cromwell
opposed ‘imperial’ kingship if ‘empire’ meant the Crown’s right to rule without the
•

consent o f parliament.”

7&

Cromwell endeavored to fashion a constitutional monarchy

in which parliament and the king would perform interdependent roles in the law•

making process.

70

By enacting the religious and political aspects of the Reformation

through statute, he did just this, effectively establishing parliament’s permanent role
in Tudor government. As Henry’s children would discover, what had been legislated
by parliament could not be undone by royal will.
Cromwell’s personal experience as a member of parliament and his close
correspondence with Tudor common lawyers convinced him of parliament’s
legislative significance. He was particularly influenced by the parliamentary theories
o f Christopher St. German. An octogenerian by the 1530s, St. German was a wellpublished and respected champion o f the common law.

ftfi

During the tumultuous

years o f the early 1530s, St. German’s advocacy for the universal application of
parliamentary statute led him into a widely publicized feud with Thomas More, who

77 Guy, Tudor England. 371; Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 169.
78 Guy, Tudor England. 133.
79 G. R. Elton, “The Political Creed o f Thomas Cromwell,” chap. in Studies in Tudor and Stuart
Politics and Government vol. 2, Parliament/Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1974), 233.
80 John Guy, “Thomas More and Christopher St. German: The Battle o f the Books,” in Reassessing the
Henrician Age, eds. Alistair Fox and John Guy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 99-100. St. German’s
popularity sprang partially from his decision to publish his writings in English rather than the
traditional French. According to Guy, his Doctor and Student and the New Additions supplement went
through “numerous editions; it was on sale in rival commercial editions within twelve months of initial
publication, it was a standard law text for English legal students in the sixteenth century.”
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was ultimately martyred for his rejection of parliamentary ascendancy.81 According
to Guy, their heated debate was “akin to a major political confrontation in the daily
newspaper.”82
Galvanized by a strident anticlericalism, St. German made the unprecedented
suggestion that the king-in-parliament had the authority to legislate on both spiritual
and temporal issues as early as 1530.83 He even went so far as to claim that the
divorce Henry so badly desired could be achieved by an act of the king-in•
84 r
,
parliament. Though Cromwell did not adopt this secular solution to the divorce, he
was attracted to St. German’s radical theory o f the king-in-parliament for two reasons:
first, it provided a rationale for parliament’s omnicompetence by raising statutory
common law over canon law, and second, the notion of the king-in-parliament
theoretically “neutralized” Henry’s absolutism by stipulating that Henry could
exercise his imperialism only as a member of the tripartite body o f parliament.85 In
other words, St. German asserted that the mixed body of the ‘king-in-parliament’
rather than the ‘vicar o f God’ was the ‘high sovereign over the people.’86
Cromwell incorporated St. German’s notion of mixed sovereignty into the
very statues that secured the Reformation and Henrician imperialism. The text o f the
Dispensations Act (1534) reads “your Royal Majesty and your Lords spiritual and

81 Elton, “Lex Terrae Victrix,” 23.
82 Guy, “Battle o f the Books,” 111.
83 St. German repeatedly made this claim in the New Additions to Doctor and Student, ed. T. F. T.
Plucknett and J. L. Barton (London: Seldon Society, 1974), 317-340. When referring to parliament, he
included the king as a member o f this body, stating, “there was a lawe made... in the parlyament holden
in the .xxi. yere o f our souerayne lorde kynge Henry the .viii. by the assente o f he kynge, and of all the
lordes spirituall and temporall of the realme, and of all the commons...,” 317.
84 Guy, “Henrician Age”, 111.
85 Guy, “Henrician Age,” 28.
86 Quoted in Guy, “Henrician Age,” 29.
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temporal and Commons, representing the whole state of your realm in this your most
High Court of Parliament...”87 Similarly, the Act of Proclamations (1539) posits a
single authoritative body: “be it therefore enacted by the authority of this present
Parliament, with the King’s Majesty’s, his Lords spiritual and temporal and the
Commons’ assent...”88 By far the most influential Act to contain both Cromwell’s
parliamentary focus and Henry’s imperial perspective was the Act of Appeals (1533).
According to Guy, this Act contained a “dramatic internal contradiction;” it
simultaneously declared Henry’s caesaropapism and parliament’s omnicompetence,
two absolute powers that presumably could not exist together in one government.89
Guy contends that the Act may have represented a compromise between Henry
and Cromwell.90 Though the legendary preamble established England’s imperialism
and Henry’s supreme headship, in the body of the text Cromwell “shifted the focus
away from theological principles and from the nature of the king’s supremacy, to
parliament’s defense of the temporal interest of the realm.” Nicolson further explains
that during the lengthy drafting stage, Cromwell circumscribed the act to a large
extent, “cut[ting] out the explicit statements of the derivation of all jurisdiction from
the king.”91 The original drafts themselves show that as many times as Cromwell
deleted these references, Henry himself wrote them back in.

87 Quoted in Elton, Tudor Constitution. 361.
88 Ibid., 28.
89 Guy, Tudor England. 371; Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 172.
90 Guy, “Intellectual Origins,” 172.
91 Nicolson, 29.
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As Guy persuasively argues, the passing of the Act resulted in an “ambiguity
[that] permeated the theory of supremacy for the remainder o f the Tudor period.”92
Theoretically, Tudor imperial kingship rested on the foundation of mixed monarchy.
However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that this ambiguity led to overt political
conflict during Henry’s reign. According to Elton, just the opposite was the case.
Henry’s realm was characterized by a harmonious relationship between Crown and
parliament in which both gained in status and worked in concert to legislate the
Reformation and Henry’s succession. Elton attributes this “harmony” to superb
management by both Cromwell, who sought to maintain a productive partnership
between Crown and parliament, and Henry, whose personal magnetism and
commanding presence neutralized animosity toward his policies.93 Henry himself
acknowledged the cooperative role o f the king-in-parliament during his reign in 1542
when he noted that “we at no time stand so highly in our estate royal as in the time of
Parliament, where in we as head and you as members are conjoined and knit together
into one body politic....”94
Having gained the imperial title he desperately coveted, Henry seemed to lose
little by this admission, and, in practice, the men of parliament rarely questioned the
judgments o f their powerful male monarch. Ideologically, however, Cromwell’s
inclusion o f St. German’s joint ruling body portended a revolution in the
governmental role o f parliament. Though previously omitted from political treatises,
after the 1530s parliament became an “automatic point of reference” in the thinking of

92 Guy, Tudor England, 133.
93 Elton, “Political Creed”, 235; Elton, Tudor Constitution. 312.
94 Quoted in Elton, Tudor Constitution. 177.
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proponents of constitutional monarchy.95 During Elizabeth’s reign, the institution
was clearly conceived as a limiting force on royal power by many political theorists,
among them the religious figure John Aylmer in An Harbor owe fo r Faithfull and
Trewe Subjects and the well-known politician Sir Thomas Smith in De Republica
Anglorum.96 This empire of England, so far removed from being ruled by an absolute
monarch, would now be defined by the mixed sovereignty o f its king or queen-inparliament.

3.

The Royal Succession

Though Henry and Cromwell may have maintained the well-oiled machine of
the king-in-parliament, the question remained as to whether this same unity of
purpose would endure between Crown and parliament in the reigns of his successors.
To a significant extent, Henry’s own machinations on the issue o f the succession
determined that the answer to this question would be a resounding no. In his quest to
secure the imperial kinship of Tudor monarchs by producing a male heir, Henry made
his succession and his children’s imperialism severely problematic.
Immediately following his divorce from Catherine of Aragon and remarriage
to Anne Boleyn, Henry and parliament passed his first Succession Act (1534),
bastardizing his daughter Mary and placing Anne’s future offspring in line for the
throne. Exercising his new authority as the divinely-chosen supreme head o f the
Church o f England, Henry arranged for the text o f the Act to closely imitate the

95 Elton, “Body o f the Whole Realm,” 23.
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lengthy biblical prohibitions on incest, thereby using his “unnatural” marriage with
Catherine to make a more general statement on the evils o f incestuous relations. As
explained by Bruce Boehrer, despite Henry’s confidence in his own ability to interpret
God’s will, “the first Succession Act - which places itself in the rhetorical position of
God’s own scriptural word - suffers from the irony that while speaking for God, it has
the disadvantage o f lacking his omniscience.”97
Indeed, within two years o f the first Act, Henry began to fear that the curse
God had placed upon him for incest had not been lifted. Anne’s seeming inability to
produce a healthy male child prompted Henry to again turn to parliament for a further
limitation o f his succession. Just as he had done to Catherine, Henry blamed Anne
for participating in incestuous relations, thereby preventing him from attaining the
illusive male heir. On these grounds, the Succession Act o f 1536 annulled Henry’s
marriage to Anne and proclaimed Elizabeth as well as Mary to be illegitimate and
“utterly foreclosed, excluded, and barred to claim... any inheritance as lawful heir to
your Highness by lineal descent.”98 The new order o f succession promoted Jane
Seymour’s potential children to heirs apparent while investing Henry with the
unprecedented power to stipulate the succession through his last will and testament.99
In 1544, satisfied that a queen had finally bore him a male heir, Henry and
parliament reinstated his daughters in the succession after Edward in order of their

96 John Aylmer, An Harborowe for Faithfull and Trewe Subjects (New York: De Capo Press, Inc.,
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99 See text o f Second Succession Act in Mortimer Levine, Tudor Dynastic Problems (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973), 156.
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birth. Crucially, the king-in-parliament never overturned those previous acts that had
proclaimed Mary and Elizabeth illegitimate and nullified their respective claims to the
throne. The Succession Act of 1544 also declared that this order of succession and
that which would be contained in Henry’s last will and testament could not be altered,
even by his heirs, on penalty of treason.100
Henry’s will is perhaps the most remarkable piece of legislation in this series
o f erratic and often contradictory limitations on the succession. As stipulated by the
Second Succession Act o f 1536, after his only legitimate heir, Edward, Henry could
determine the order of succession without being held to the strictures o f heredity, law,
or custom. Mortimer Levine succinctly expresses the import of this discretionary
authority; “no English monarch before or since has ever had this statutory power.”101
To succeed Edward, Henry chose his two bastardized daughters and the offspring of
his youngest rather than his eldest sister, whom he excluded on account of their
foreign birth.

1no

The king-in-parliament summarily gave Henry’s will the force of

statutory law in 1546. Thus, by numerous succession acts, the threat o f treason, and
the force o f law, Henry sought to bind his heirs to his own royal will. In reality, he
rendered them permanently dependent on parliament.
At the most basic level, Henry made the succession, which had previously
been considered a private matter of royal prerogative, a public issue by including
parliament in the decision-making process. He called on parliament specifically to
address the crisis resulting from Anne Boleyn’s failure to produce an heir in 1536,

100 See text o f Third Succession Act in Levine, Dynastic Problems. 162.
101 Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 67.
102 See text o f Heniy’s will in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 163.
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and did so again in 1540 when he desired to free himself o f Anne of Cleves.103 Even
his authority to determine the succession though his will, arguably his most imperial
maneuver, required parliamentary approval to become law. In these and other matters
dealing with the succession, Henry probably viewed parliament as an expedient
means to transform his will into law. But, whatever his true intentions, he created a
powerful precedent for parliament’s participation in the succession, a precedent that
vexed each of his children. Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth respectively discovered that
they could not alter Henry’s succession without parliament’s consent because his will
was enshrined in statute. Only the joint body o f the king-in-parliament could
transcend this legal obstacle to royal will. As Elton quipped, “the only creatures not
bound to parliament were its successors.”104
Mary and Elizabeth were even more deeply bound to parliament because their
very titles were founded on statute rather than hereditary right. Still legally
illegitimate when they inherited the throne, Henry’s daughters were forced to enlist
parliament to overturn Henry’s bastardizing legislation and proclaim valid their
claims to the throne.105 This parliamentary legitimacy was also necessary to
overcome the taint o f incest Henry had bequeathed to his daughters. In his endeavors
to vilify Catherine and Anne and vindicate himself, Henry had constructed a “thick
gauze of incestuous narrative. [With] both their mothers adjudged guilty of incest at
different times, neither daughter could advance an absolutely unconflicted claim to

103 Jennifer Loach, Parliament Under the Tudors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 89.
104 Elton, “Body o f the Whole Realm,” 52.
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the English crown.”106 During the early part of her reign, Elizabeth’s title was
repeatedly contested by much of Catholic Europe through the person of Mary Queen
o f Scots, who claimed the throne for herself on account of Elizabeth’s illegitimacy.107
In effect, Henry rang the death knell for hereditary divine right and imperial kingship
when he imperiled his daughters’ legal and sexual legitimacy. Though carrying out
his legislative revolution through parliamentary means did little to undermine Henry’s
own imperial power, his children would ultimately pay the price for his expedient
inclusion of parliament in determining the royal succession.

106 Boehrer, 3, 45.
107 Jones, Elizabethan Age. 138.

CHAPTER TWO
Elizabeth I: A Woman Who Refused to be Counseled
1.

Precedents o f those less “mete” to rule

Though Henry’s decisions regarding the succession were erratic and a source
o f political and religious consternation, the men in parliament did not question his
authority to make them. The same cannot be said for his children, whose reigns were
marked by parliamentary opposition to monarchical policies on the related issues o f
marriage and the succession. As explained by John Aylmer, in a political tract written
on the eve o f Elizabeth’s accession, women and children sovereigns were not as fit to
make wise decisions as mature male monarchs and therefore required more guidance.
In general, he wrote, “the male is more mete to rule then the female” and “King
Edward for his years and tenderness o f age was not so mete to rule, as was his father
King Henry.”

The less-than-mete status o f Henry’s children thus encouraged

parliament to take a more active role in determining the succession where it had
offered only passive consent during Henry’s reign.
On his deathbed, Edward and his advisors constructed a will stipulating the
accession o f his Protestant cousin Jane Grey in place o f his Catholic half-sister Mary.
Edward contrived this change in the line o f succession both because he regarded Jane
as his “spiritual sister” who would continue to carry out his godly reformation and

108 Aylmer, sig. 12v; C4r.
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because he considered both Mary and Elizabeth illegitimate and thus unable to occupy
the throne.109 In spite of the young king’s divine will, this royal limitation o f the
succession proved untenable and even treasonable because it had not been enacted by
the king-in-parliament. Following Edward’s death, the extra-parliamentary coup to
alter the succession in favor of the Lady Jane also failed and, as stipulated by Henry’s
will, Mary inherited the throne. Crucially, only Henry’s will was considered
legitimate because it had been given the force of statute by parliamentary consent.110
Despite Henry’s final endorsement of Mary as the rightful heir to the throne,
Edward had not been mistaken about Mary’s illegitimate legal status. In his First and
Second Succession Acts (1534 and 1536), Henry had bastardized his eldest daughter.
The text of the Second Act reads, “the issue bom of the same unlawful marriage, shall
be deemed illegitimate... [and shall be] barred to claim, challenge, or demand any
inheritance as lawful heir to your Highness by lineal descent.”111 In order to overturn
their former legislation, Mary summoned parliament to pass “An Act Declaring Mary
I Legitimate.”

119

This Act resacralized Henry’s marriage to Catherine, reinstated

Mary’s claim to the throne, and reaffirmed parliament’s role in determining the royal
succession. The Act can also be interpreted as an expansion of parliament’s role
since Mary’s sovereignty, unlike Henry’s, appeared to rest on the authority o f a
parliamentary statute. Mary’s dependence on parliament for her very title clearly
compromised Tudor imperial kingship as it was understood by her father.

109 Dale Hoak, “End Game: The Succession Crisis o f 1553,” in The Reign of Edward VI (Forthcoming,
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In matters of religion, Mary also discovered her reliance on parliament: what
had been done by parliament could only be undone by the same. Calling five
parliaments in five years, Mary found her male MPs willing to repeal the Henrician
and Edwardian religious settlements and restore England to the Catholic faith. To
Mary’s frustration, these men proved less congenial to her plans for marriage and the
succession. As an imperial monarch, Mary did not believe it her duty to discuss her
marital affairs with the men in parliament, but under mounting pressure from her
Commons, she admitted a deputation in November of 1553 to address the subject. In
their speech, the MPs encouraged Mary to marry quickly, as the succession was
unsettled, and to marry an Englishman, as a foreign male consort could conspire to
seize the throne for himself. Mary, who had secretly pledged herself to Philip of
Spain in late October, was understandably annoyed at Parliament’s unsolicited advice.
Her retort that “parliament was not accustomed to use such language to the kings of
England,” was accurate; parliament had never asked a single, male monarch to marry
and certainly would not presume to limit his marital choices.113
Ignoring parliament’s counsel, Mary made public her betrothal to Philip the
day after the legislative body had been dissolved. In reaction to the specter of a
Spanish marriage, a number of MPs, and other o f Mary’s subjects, joined Wyatt’s
rebellion. Though the uprising was unsuccessful in preventing the queen’s marriage
to Philip, it did procure a noteworthy promise from Mary herself. Mary pledged not
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to marry without the consent of the realm, a breach of autonomy not previously
granted by English monarchs.114
At this point, it is crucial to consider the motivations behind parliament’s
unprecedented actions. Why had parliament found it necessary both to exhort the
queen to marry and to warn against a foreigner? Why had some extremists rebelled
against their sovereign’s choice o f a marriage partner? As de la Torre persuasively
argues, Mary’s gender prompted the all-male parliament to interfere in issues that had
previously been considered matters of royal prerogative.115 Mary’s male consort was
much more important than a male monarch’s spouse because in the gender hierarchy
o f marriage, the MPs believed, the husband would wield greater power.116 The
xenophobic English had little desire to see their female monarch subordinate to a
powerful Spaniard.
These gendered assumptions led parliament to pass two statutes that, in effect,
restricted the queen’s sovereign will. After creating a marriage treaty between Mary
and Philip that rendered Philip almost powerless, parliament took the unprecedented
action of turning the treaty into statute. This action could be considered a response to
Mary’s promise to obtain the realm’s consent on her marriage, but from a gendered
perspective, it suggests that parliament felt only the highest form o f the law could
circumvent the natural hierarchy of marriage.117 As stipulated in the law, Mary “as
our onely Quene, shal and may solye and as a sole quene use, have, and enioye the

114 Loach, Marv Tudor. 15.
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Crowne and Soverayntye....”118 MPs therefore took the greatest precaution that the
“onely and sole Quene” Mary, not her husband Philip, would rule England. In the
words o f Judith Richards, “every effort was being made, it seemed, to ensure that
‘monarchy’ took precedence over ‘female’.119
Parliament also made it clear to Mary that Philip would not be crowned as the
king o f England, an event that both the English and Spanish considered symbolically
necessary to legitimize Philip’s power. The role of a king consort was still so
ambiguous that parliament feared Philip’s crowning would make him an anointed
king invested with a royal authority that “could override anything previously agreed
by international treaty or confirmed by parliamentary statute.”120 Though Mary
claimed that she would crown Philip on her own initiative, the resistance she would
meet in parliament convinced her not to do so, despite the fact that a consort’s
•

coronation had clearly been a matter o f royal prerogative in previous reigns.

1^1

A second statute, which purported to buttress Mary’s rule as a married
woman, also circumscribed her sovereignty. Because she was female, parliament
worried that upon her marriage, Mary, like any other woman, would become a feme
covert. That is, she would no longer legally be considered an autonomous person but
an appendage o f her husband. Parliament obviously found this legal subordination
problematic in the case of a female monarch, especially one marrying a foreign
prince. Therefore, it passed an act stating that queens o f England enjoyed the same
powers as kings, “any custom, use, or scruple, or any other thing whatsoever to be

118 Quoted in Richards, 908-909.
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made to the contrary notwithstanding.”122 The fact that this statute was enacted,
however, implied that queens were not inherently equal to kings. Indeed, the Act
suggested that a queen could not rule as sovereign without a parliamentary statute.
According to de la Torre, from this perspective, “parliament’s own power seemed
augmented. It was sanctioning the rule o f the sovereign, and did so only because that
sovereign happened to be woman.”123
Thus, Mary’s status as a female monarch proved decisive in the extension of
parliament’s legislative purview into royal marriages and the succession. As argued
by de la Torre, parliament’s increasing interference was not the product o f some
conspiracy to usurp sovereignty from the monarch but was rather predicated on their
fear o f Philip’s power as a husband.124 Though parliament could not stop Mary from
marrying Philip, they sought to strip him o f his marital superiority and refused to
endorse his coronation, all against the queen’s express wishes.125 Parliament also
thwarted the queen’s desires in regard to the succession. According to Jennifer
Loach, they were “successful in preventing the queen from altering the constitutional
powers and position of either her husband or her sister.”126 Though Mary intended to
disinherit Elizabeth because o f her “heretical opinions, illegitimacy, and
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characteristics in which she resembled her mother,” she never broached the subject
with her parliaments, realizing they were loath to overturn Henry’s statutory will.127
Loach suggests that “certainly an idea existed that Henry VIII’s will, and the
order o f the succession therein contained, could not be altered” but she does not
explore why this may have been the case.128 Why indeed were neither Edward nor
Mary granted parliamentary sanction to replace Henry’s will with their own when
Henry himself had changed the succession four times? John Aylmer provided the
answer: women and children, even if they were monarchs, could not be trusted to
perceive what was best for England. In both Mary and Edward’s reigns, male MPs
appeared more inclined to protect what they deemed the future safety of the realm
than to follow the royal whims of a minor, who supported an unlawful heir, and a
woman, who made a poor marital choice. Though Loach refers to parliament’s
opposition to Mary’s policies as “passive resistance,” it seems to me that parliament
took a decidedly active, masculine role in limiting their female monarch’s
prerogative, a trend that would continue under Elizabeth.129
In an effort to fend off the parliamentary interference that had troubled her
sister, Elizabeth claimed that her marriage and the succession were matters of arcana
imperii.

That is, these issues were mysteries o f state that fell under the private

purview o f the imperial monarch. Unfortunately for Elizabeth, the precedent for
public discussion of the succession was by now well entrenched, and like her sister,
Elizabeth herself was dependent on parliament for her claim to the throne. If, as
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Elizabeth claimed* parliament could not determine the succession, she would
undermine the legitimacy of the very acts that made her queen.131 Clearly, the
relationship between Crown and parliament had changed significantly since Henry’s
reign. Though Henry’s children still described themselves as imperial kings, their
imperialism was decidedly less autonomous and subject to greater “guidance” on the
part o f parliament. Parliament was no longer a rubber-stamp institution that simply
consented to the monarch’s decisions. Instead, MPs actively influenced royal
marriage and the succession, going so far as to thwart the sovereign’s will on these
issues.
By the time o f Elizabeth’s accession, her counselors had adopted a “political
creed” that reflected the precedents o f former Tudor reigns. According to John Guy
and Stephen Alford, this creed was composed o f three elements: sovereignty
belonged to the queen-in-parliament as defined by St. German and Cromwell in
Henry’s reign; imperial prerogative was limited by the counsel o f parliament; the
consent o f the whole realm in parliament was required to determine issues of religion
and the succession.

1

Resonating with the rhetoric of counsel, this creed exposed the

latent tensions between conciliarism and imperial kingship, as it was understood by
Henry VIII and the independent-minded Elizabeth. Written ostensibly in support of
Elizabeth’s imperial claim to the throne, John Aylmer’s 1559 Harbor owe fo r Faithful
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and Trewe Subjects provides a window into the potential conciliar erosion o f imperial
kingship under a female queen and a male parliament.

2. An Harborowe fo r Faithfull and Trewe Subjects
In 1558 the Scottish reformer John Knox published a rabid attack on
queenship entitled the First Blast o f the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment o f
Women. Knox had directed his Blast specifically against the Catholic reigns of Mary
o f Guise, regency queen of Scotland; Catherine de Medici, queen mother of France;
and Mary Tudor, queen of England. Unfortunately for the Protestant Knox, by the
time the Blast reached the public, Mary Tudor had died and her sister Elizabeth, a
Protestant queen, occupied the English throne. The poor timing o f his vindictive tract
caused considerable concern among other Protestant reformers, many of whom were
Marian exiles who wished to return to England with Elizabeth’s blessing. These
theologians surmised, quite rightly, that Knox’s harsh words would damage their own
reputations. In an attempt to declare his support for Elizabeth, and denounce his
association with Knox, John Aylmer, the Marian exile and future bishop o f London,
wrote his Harborowe fo r Faithfull and Trewe Subjects.

too

Though both reformers relied on scriptural passages to construct their
arguments, Knox chose to emphasize universal ordinances that applied to all women,

133 There is some dissension over the level of disagreement between Knox and Aylmer. Patricia-Ann
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where Aylmer focused on examples of women who had transcended these
stereotypes. To Knox, all women, including female monarchs, had been tainted by
the sins o f Eve and permanently occupied a subordinate position in the divinelyordained sexual order.134 St. Paul had reaffirmed God’s condemnation of women’s
lack of reason when he barred women from speaking in public because o f their false
prophesizing. From Knox’s theological perspective, these divine precepts forbidding
women to speak or rule over men superceded secular laws that allowed women to
1o r

ascend the throne.

Women who had become monarchs were therefore

“monstrous,” unnatural, and the object of God’s wrath. In order to prove his
proposition, Knox reminded his readers of the fanatical Catholicism o f Mary Tudor.
It was clear to Knox that English Protestants were suffering God’s punishment for
endorsing the rule of a woman.
To prevent this same apocalyptic logic from being used to resist Elizabeth’s
rule, Aylmer sought to undermine Knox’s argument that Mary Tudor’s behavior was
representative o f women rulers. He first claimed that Mary herself was innocent but
had been deceived by conspiring Papists. He wrote, “Queen Mary, who bearing, and
wearing a woman’s heart, could not (I think), have used such rigor and extremity...
unless she had been bewitched by her Cardinal, Bishops, and Churchmen.”

In this

manner, he endorsed Knox’s religious enemy, the Papists, but separated the evils of
Catholicism from the rule o f women. Though this explanation effectively removed
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the stain o f guilt from Mary, it also undermined her individual agency and autonomy.
This passage thus suggests that Aylmer’s belief in the legitimacy of female rule was
coupled with the perception that female monarchs could be easily manipulated.
Though Mary had allowed herself to be persuaded by the wrong advisors,
Aylmer contended that her poor choices were not those of all female rulers. In other
words, he refused to acknowledge Knox’s argument by generalization. He accused
Knox of mistakenly moving “from the particular to the general,” when instead Mary’s
“folly was an accident to her person, and not proper to her sex.”137 To substantiate his
claim that poor rule was not “proper” to female leaders, he offered the biblical figure
of Deborah, who “judged the people of Israel, and the people resorteth unto her, she
delivered them out of thraldome, and set them at liberty.”138 In addition to Deborah,
he compiled an impressive list o f effective women rulers from ancient and modem
history “where by the ordinance of God, and order of law, women have reigned, and
those not a few.”

1

In Aylmer’s narrative of scriptural and secular history, women

had mled well and had not been excluded from positions o f power. How then, he
asked, could Knox claim that women’s rule was universally monstrous and unnatural?
With Mary’s disastrous reign safely categorized as an aberration in a history of
otherwise capable women rulers, Aylmer proceeded to attack another of Knox’s
generalizations, namely that God’s will was separate from and antithetical to earthly
law. According to Aylmer, God’s laws were manifest in human legal customs. In
particular, he espied the workings o f divine will in the succession. Not only was
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138 Ibid., sig. D2v.
139 Aylmer, sig. C4r.

47
lineal descent a secular practice, but the royal family in question had been specially
chosen by God. Because this was the case, Aylmer reasoned “for some secret purpose
He mindeth the female should reign and govern. If we consider the works o f God: we
shall find... that where was least help of man or any worldly means: there wrought He
greatest wonders and brought things to a most happy end.”140
In other words, if God selected a woman to be the instrument of his will, men
should not be such “presumptuous fools” to question his wisdom. After all, did he
not send the boy David to slay the giant Goliath?141 Though Elizabeth may be a
woman, Aylmer warned his fellow Englishmen not to underestimate her worth in the
eyes o f God. She was not sent as a sign of God’s wrath, as Knox had claimed, but as
God’s chosen representative on earth. Consequently, she deserved the obedience that
Englishmen would show to God himself. “It is thy part to know and learn, and after
to do and perform all manner of duty to her, which occupieth by most just title, the
imperial throne of this realm.”142
In order to counter Knox’s denunciation o f female rule, Aylmer had painted a
powerful image o f Elizabeth and the imperial queenship that she wielded. Legitimate
in the eyes o f God and the law, Aylmer argued that Englishmen were duty-bound to
follow the sovereign will of this woman whom he described as well-educated,
modest, and a humble servant of God.143 But, no matter how impressed he was with
her credentials, Aylmer could not escape the fact that Elizabeth was a woman. While
her gender did not make her an unnatural ruler as Knox had suggested, it did render
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her unequal to a male monarch.144 Aylmer described a male sovereign as the major,
that is “the most natural to preserve and maintain the society of men,” while the
woman is the minor and therefore not as “convenient [but] not so heinous, and
intolerable as this man [Knox] maketh it.”145
As a woman, Aylmer considered Elizabeth as impressionable as her sister
Mary. In his words, her education had “fashioneth and frameth her mind (as Plato
sayeth) and maketh it tractable as wax, to print in good images o f virtues and modest
manners.”146 In other words, Elizabeth’s education did not prepare her to make
autonomous decisions but instead molded her to accept the guidance of God and her
male counselors. Like the biblical Deborah, Elizabeth was regarded as an exceptional
woman but still expected to “serve in her office as an instrument” o f others’ will.147
Aylmer may have argued that Elizabeth was the rightful holder of the imperial throne,
but in practice, he believed her gender limited her ability to exercise imperial
queenship independently. Though Henry’s de facto power was little diminished by
the apparent compromise between imperial kingship and counsel contained in the Act
o f Appeals, as a female monarch Elizabeth was more susceptible to the implications
o f the Henrician compromise: the advent o f mixed and mitigated monarchy.
To ensure his readers that Elizabeth would listen to the right counselors,
unlike her sister Mary, Aylmer delineated three sources o f authority that would
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mitigate her rule: God, the law, and the men in parliament. Aylmer reasoned that just
as God determined the succession o f earthly governments, he ruled as partner with his
chosen sovereigns. In the case of Elizabeth, this omniscient male guide would make
up for her female inferiority. “If He join to His strength: she can not be weak. If He
put to his hand she cannot be feeble, if He be with her who can stand against her?”148
If his readers remained unconvinced that God would take such an active role in
guiding Elizabeth, Aylmer suggested that they need not fear because English
monarchs did not possess despotic powers. That is, whether male or female,
sovereigns must abide by the law.149 He wrote, “it is not in England so dangerous a
matter, to have a woman ruler, as men take it to be: For it is not she that rulleth but
the laws.”150 Crucially, these laws were made with the consent o f the realm by the
queen-in-parliament. The queen’s decisions would therefore be carefully mitigated by
this all-male advisory council, the “fathers o f the country” as Aylmer called them. In
his words, “if the parliament use their privileges: the King can ordain nothing
without them.... Those that in King Henry the VIII’s days would not grant him that
his proclamations should have the force o f statute, were good fathers o f the
country.”151
It had been Thomas Cromwell who formulated the concept o f the king-inparliament and faciliated parliament’s actions regarding the Act o f Proclamations in
order to augment parliament’s legislative and advisory role in Tudor government.
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Theoretically, the relationship between monarch and parliament had remained
unchanged since Cromwell’s revolution, but as Aylmer’s tract demonstrates, under a
minor and a woman, the men o f parliament had taken on a larger, more active role in
state matters than Cromwell had envisioned. Aylmer coupled parliament’s
precedented legislative role with its duty to counsel the queen, being always “at her
elbow,” to argue that Elizabeth’s rule was less than imperial. In his words, “the
regiment o f England is not a mere monarchy... nor a mere Oligarchy, nor Democracy,
but a rule mixte o f all these, wherein each one of these has or should have like
authority.”

1O

Thus, while Aylmer’s treatise may have legitimized Elizabeth’s right to

rule, it also rationalized parliament’s extended role in guiding a female monarch. As
summarized by de la Torre, Aylmer’s tract suggests “it was not the weak, inferior
woman who actually formulated policy.... Elizabeth’s actual exercise of political
power would be mitigated by her male Parliament, and in addressing the succession
issue, MPs apparently took this theory to heart.”153

3.

The Queen’s Two Bodies

Though Aylmer’s Harbor owe may have been prophetic in terms o f his
suggestions for parliament’s mitigating role, he, like everyone else, never foresaw
Elizabeth’s obdurate resistance to the guidance of her MPs. As it turned out,
Elizabeth’s mind was not made o f the impressionable wax he had expected: she
forsook simple dress and advice and, most significantly, refused to marry. When
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writing his Harborowe, Aylmer, of course, could not imagine Elizabeth’s later
policies and therefore assumed she would fulfill her duties as both woman and
monarch and marry to produce an heir. With Mary’s Spanish marriage, which had
pulled England into an unwanted war, still fresh in mind, Aylmer attempted to prove
that Elizabeth’s duty as a wife would not compromise her ability to rule. To do so, he
employed the political fiction o f the queen’s two bodies.
Tudor common lawyers, most notably Edmund Plowden, used this concept to
distinguish between the corruptible natural body of the monarch and the immortal
body of the state that the sovereign possessed during his or her lifetime.154 Though it
began as an esoteric concept discussed only in the Inns of Court, Marie Axton argues
that the distinction between the queen’s two bodies appeared in Shakespearean drama,
iconography, histories, and political tracts, making it a widely recognized concept
during Elizabeth’s reign.155 Aylmer’s Harborowe was one such document that
played a role in popularizing the theory. Treating Elizabeth’s two bodies as separate
entities, Aylmer argued that her body natural could function as a subordinate wife
while her body politic remained that o f a sovereign monarch. In his words, “so far as
pertaineth to the bands o f marriage, and that office of a wife, she must be subject, but
as a Magistrate she may be her husband’s head.”156 By employing the two bodies,
Aylmer thus accomplished the same aim as parliament’s statutory emasculation of
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Mary’s husband Philip: an adaptation of the established gender hierarchy. The
queen’s superior body politic could transcend her female body natural, enabling
Elizabeth to remain sovereign within the matrimonial state.
Differentiating Elizabeth’s two bodies also proved useful for Aylmer when he
wished to convince his audience that, although she might be an all-too-human female,
the office she held had been divinely ordained. Of monarchs, he wrote, we “should
behold in them not only flesh and blood, which they have in common with us, but
also a divine and godly majesty, which they have given them o f god. So that we
should rather fix our eyes upon their office, which is god’s: then upon their person
which is m an’s.”

Aylmer’s application o f the queen’s two bodies in such distinct

ways speaks to the flexibility of this theory that was alternately used to describe
Elizabeth’s bodies as jointly godly and human, public and private, corporate and
individual, and most significantly, male and female.
The legal concept o f the monarch’s two bodies, like the monarch-inparliament, was not invented during Elizabeth’s reign but took on greater implications
because o f that ruler’s female gender. Henry VIII also had two bodies, but the
divergence between his body natural and body politic, both gendered masculine, did
not appear so large that they required distinction. In Elizabeth’s case, her female
gender, which rendered her natural body subordinate, clashed visibly with her
sovereign male body politic, prompting her subjects to question which of her two
bodies would predominate. In other words, was Elizabeth a woman who happened to
be sovereign or a sovereign who happened to be a woman?

156 Ibid., sig. C4v. See also D3r, Glr, G3r.
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As we have already seen, Aylmer and Knox offered opposite answers to this
question. For Aylmer, though Elizabeth’s gender made her less “mete” to rule than a
male monarch, both God and English law legitimized her sovereign status. Therefore,
as long as she followed the advice o f her male counselors, her identity as monarch
transcended her female gender. Knox would grant no such exceptions to the universal
divine injunction against female rule. Secular law, which placed Elizabeth in line for
the throne, could not supersede her natural inferiority as stipulated by God’s law. To
Knox, Elizabeth was first and foremost defined by her womanhood.
Those citizens of London who constructed Elizabeth’s coronation entry
pageant veered closer to Knox’s position, defining the queen in unmistakably
feminine terms. In her analysis of the coronation text written by Richard Mulcaster,
entitled the Q ueen’s M ajesty’s Passage, Susan Frye emphasizes the gendered nature
o f the dramatic allegories staged during the royal entry. During the course of the
coronation procession, Elizabeth was symbolically portrayed as a daughter, wife, and
mother, dependent on her male citizens for guidance.

1

In the fourth pageant of her

entry, the English Bible is presented to Elizabeth, portrayed as Truth, the Daughter of
Time. What may appear to be a straightforward affirmation o f English Protestantism,
argues Frye, is actually underpinned by expectations based on Elizabeth’s gender.
Two contrasting hills comprised the scenery of this pageant to symbolize the reigns of
Mary and Elizabeth. The Marian hill was barren and stony, entitled “a decayed
common weale,” where Elizabeth’s hill was beautiful and fertile, described as “a
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florishing commonweale.” The figure who gives the Bible to the new queen is bom
out o f a cave on Elizabeth’s productive hill. According to the Mulcaster’s coronation
text, Elizabeth accepted the Bible as a mother would embrace her child, laying it upon
her breast.159 The import o f this analogy, asserts Frye, is that the queen’s embrace
“formed a contract as permanent and natural as motherhood in her marriage to city
interests.”160
Another pageant device suggested that her masculine citizens would accept
Elizabeth as mother figure only conditionally. The ideal Elizabeth is depicted upon
the Seate o f Worthie Governance, accepting the virtues o f Pure Religion, Love of
Subjects, Wisdom, and Justice, while rejecting the vices of Rebellion, Insolence,
Folly, Vain Glory, and Bribery.161 If she strayed from this moral model, the creators
o f the pageant warned, her exalted position as governmental head would be in
jeopardy. As explained in the Passage, “the Queene’s majestie was established in the
seate o f govemement: so she should syt fast in the same so long as she embraced
vertue.”

1A ?

•

•

Significantly, no hereditary male king had ever been threatened with

deposition if he displayed vain glory or insolence by refusing to be counseled. These
two traits were thought to be quintessentially female failings. Because o f her gender,
Elizabeth would be held to a standard o f behavior that befit her feminine body natural,
not her princely body politic.
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In sixteenth-century England, gendered definitions of virtue created this
double standard o f monarchical behavior.163 For King Henry VIII, who sired several
bastards during his reign, sexual conquests only augmented a virile reputation that
was also officially measured by battlefield prowess. This was not the case for
Elizabeth whose feminine virtue was associated with her chastity. According to Carol
Levin and Norman Jones, Elizabeth’s chaste reputation was repeatedly challenged
during her early reign. Elizabeth and her advisors attempted to quell rumors about
alleged sexual interludes and illegitimate children with her acknowledged favorite,
Robert Dudley.164 Prior to the Dudley predicament, Elizabeth had neutralized another
potential sexual scandal that had beset her as a young woman living in the household
o f Catherine Parr and Thomas Seymour.165 In this case, Elizabeth was the object of
Seymour’s repeated sexual advances.
Though Elizabeth was able to defend her feminine honor, her mother, Anne
Boleyn, had not been able to extricate herself from charges o f sexual misconduct,
resulting in her beheading. With Anne’s fate in mind, Elizabeth could not have failed
to comprehend the dire threat posed by rumors o f her defiled chastity or incestuous
birth.166 This sexual gossip could damage much more than her reputation as a
woman. As explained by Levin, “by being called unchaste, Elizabeth was also being
charged with not being a good ruler in a way that was directly connected to her
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sex.”

167

For some of her subjects, Elizabeth’s sexual and monarchical reputations

were one and the same; unlike her male counterparts, Elizabeth’s womanly failings
could undermine her body politic, rendering her unfit to remain upon the Seate of
Worthie Governance.
For Elizabeth’s councilors, marriage seemed the perfect solution to shore up
their young, female monarch’s precarious reputation. According to de la Torre, the
men o f parliament and the privy council believed that marriage would end speculation
over Elizabeth’s sexual conduct, contain and control her natural body, and provide the
queen with much-needed male guidance.168 In Cecil’s words, “God send our mistress
a husband, and by him a son, that we may hope our posterity shall have a masculine
succession. This matter is too big for weak folks and too deep for simple.”169
Elizabeth, however, “refused to assume the place o f a married woman,... [recognizing
that] she could not be fully queen and dutiful wife at once.” 170 She instead opted for
different means to deal with the gendered double standard that differentiated her reign
from the reigns o f her male predecessors.
One o f the strategies she employed to transcend the alleged limitations o f her
gender was the theory of the queen’s two bodies. If this political fiction allowed her
subjects to emphasize and denounce her feminine body, it also gave Elizabeth the
ability to define herself as a powerful male. For example, though her coronation entry
may have been specifically designed by the London citizenry to emphasize the
queen’s feminine acquiescence, when Elizabeth was given the chance to speak, she
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described herself in masculine terms. In thanking God for preserving her life so that
she may become queen, Elizabeth prayed, “I acknowledge that thou has dealt as
wonderfully and mercifully with me, as thou didst with thy true and faithfull servant
*

Daniel.”

171

In this instance, it was Elizabeth who encoded her gendered message

within a religious metaphor. In arguing for Elizabeth’s legitimacy to rule, Aylmer had
also compared Elizabeth with biblical figures, but he had chosen the women Judith
and Deborah, where as Elizabeth identified herself a male figure.
Elizabeth envisioned herself as a sovereign who happened to be a woman,
actively constructing her own image in response to those passively feminine
representations presented by others who wished to control her. She particularly
emphasized the superiority of her male body politic when dealing with her MPs. In
her response to a famous petition from parliament in 1563, Elizabeth directly
addressed and refuted her MPs assumptions concerning her gender.172 She declared,
“the weight and greatness of this matter might cause in me, being a woman wanting
both wit and memory, some fear to speak, and bashfulness besides, a thing
appropriate to my sex. But yet the princely seat and kingly throne wherein God hath
constituted me,... boldeneth me to say somewhat in this matter.”

171

The matter of which she spoke was her marriage and the succession, issues
that conflated Elizabeth’s natural and political bodies. By marrying and producing a
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child of her natural body, Elizabeth would be simultaneously creating an heir for her
body politic. Her MPs fully expected Elizabeth to carry out these dual duties of a
woman and monarch. In their 1563 petition to the queen, the Lords advised that “God
by the course o f the scripture hath declared succession and having of children to be
one o f his principal benedictions in this life, and of the contrary he hath pronounced
otherwise.” They then proceeded to remind Elizabeth of her biblical namesake,
Elizabeth, the mother of John the Baptist, who “was joyfull when God had blessed her
with fruit.”174 By using this example, her Lords insinuated that if Elizabeth remained
voluntarily childless, she would be transgressing God’s divine law. As a woman, her
duty to bear children had been decreed by God. This duty not even a monarch could
circumvent.

175

Thus, despite her own clever use of the theory of the two bodies, Elizabeth
could not escape the reality that at the beginning of her reign, everything “depended
on the deployment of her natural body.”

1* lf \

Her unmarried status, the unsecured

succession, and an ill-timed sickness drew attention to her young, frail, feminine body
at the expense o f the mature, masculine body politic Elizabeth wished to portray. To
her male advisors, Elizabeth’s succession policies were the clearest examples of the
inferiority of her female body. They believed that her womanly failings, namely her
apparent inability to secure the succession, threatened the safety of her kingly body
politic. By separating her two bodies in this manner, parliament was able to criticize
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the personal policies of their female queen while remaining steadfastly loyal to the
monarchical state, which they had pledged to preserve.

4. Parliament and the Succession
Elizabeth’s MPs and privy councilors expressed their advice and criticism
through the rhetoric o f counsel. This counsel, as expressed by the political “creed” of
Elizabeth’s principal secretary, William Cecil, limited the sovereignty o f the monarch
who was expected to abide by advice.177 This “marriage” o f imperium and consilium,
as Francis Bacon later termed it, had been made originally during Henry’s reign under
•

•

the direction o f Thomas Cromwell.

17ft

In Henry’s case, consilium was gendered

female; parliament softened the impassioned judgments of Henry’s imperium with
•

virtue and honesty.

170

Intriguingly, because Elizabeth was a woman, the genders of

imperium and consilium appear to have been reversed during her reign. No longer
content in their role as passive advisors, Elizabeth’s male counselors took a much
more assertive stance in directing their female monarch. As Aylmer had suggested,
Elizabeth’s MPs should be always “at her elbow,” mitigating and strengthening her
weaker female rule through reasoned guidance.
Elizabeth’s MPs acted on Aylmer’s advice, counselling Elizabeth that as the
queen-in-parliament they should jointly settle the succession since “by reason of this
parliament, whereby both such advice, consideration and consent as is requisite in so
great and weighty a cause, may be better had and used now then at any other time
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when no parliament is.”180 In response, Elizabeth herself employed the rhetoric of
counsel. To their plea that she settle the succession, she replied, “I say that of the
matter... I like and allow very well; as to the circumstances, if any be, I mean upon
further advice further to answer.”181 According to John Guy, Elizabeth “invoked this
‘humanist-classical’ language to argue that she needed to be ‘advised’ on matters
touching her Crown and the state, thereby turning recognition o f the need for
‘counsel’ into the excuse for rejecting parliament’s advice.”182
Elizabeth’s response to her MPs was, however, more than a clever twisting of
words meant to buy herself time. Rather, Elizabeth and the men of parliament held
fundamentally different understandings of the role counsel should play in the
succession. For Elizabeth, the succession was a private issue, a matter o f state
subsumed under her arcana imperii; because her counselors considered the
succession the cornerstone o f the realm’s future security, they viewed it as a public
issue that fell within their purview. Significantly, Elizabeth’s conception o f her
queenship was little different than her father’s sense of his imperium. Like Henry,
Elizabeth held an exalted view o f her own power, repeatedly emphasizing the
independence o f the head over its duty to abide by the counsel o f the body.

Both

monarchs were dependent on parliament, but as a strong, kingly figure, Henry had
been able to keep his feminine counsel at bay. Though she attempted to identify
herself with her male body politic, declaring that “I be a woman yet I have as good
courage answerable to my place as ever my father had,” in reality, the female
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Elizabeth was unable to control her male councilors in the same manner as her
father.

1

Her gender prompted parliament to appropriate a greater part in the

succession, a role which they could not assume under the masculine Henry. Thus, as
a woman, Elizabeth had to deal with the contradiction in Tudor monarchy that her
father had created yet avoided: imperial kingship was dependent on parliamentary
counsel.
This Henrician paradox, Elizabeth’s gender, and parliament’s duty to counsel
in the face of Elizabeth’s refusal to listen, led to parliament’s escalating interference
in the royal succession, an interference that altered the relationship between
parliament and Crown under the Tudors. It is important to clarify that by the word
escalating, I do not mean “rising” in the sense that Neale used the term. There is no
evidence that M Ps’ actions during Elizabeth’s reign were part of a long-term strategy
to modify England’s form o f government by investing sovereignty in parliament. By
escalating, I mean instead that MPs took increasingly desperate and radical measures
to fulfill their duty to counsel the queen and preserve the English state.
In 1559, parliament’s counsel took the form o f a petition to their queen
requesting that she fulfill her duty as a woman and marry. Avoiding their former faux
pas under Mary, they urged Elizabeth to marry whomever she pleased at her earliest
convenience. Elizabeth graciously offered to consider their petition, although stating
her personal preference to remain single. Significantly, she also commended their
decision not to limit her choices, stating, “if it had been otherwise, I must needs have
misliked it very much and thought it in you a very great presumption, being unfiting
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and altogether unmete for you to require them that may command.”185 In this
exchange, Elizabeth’s desire to restrict parliament’s role in the succession is already
apparent, as is parliament’s assertive counterclaim to be a deciding force in this
preeminent issue.
When parliament reconvened in 1563, Elizabeth had yet to take a husband.
Her single status prompted MPs to draft another petition counselling her to marry, to
which they also added a request that the queen-in-parliament determine a successor
who would assume the throne should the queen die childless. For her part, Elizabeth
had made clear her desire to leave the succession unsettled during her lifetime. As
Elizabeth put it, she “had no desire to be buried alive”186 as her sister had been when
protestant detractors flocked to the princess Elizabeth. To preserve her own
uncontested sovereignty and also to hold at bay the Catholic threat posed by her
Scottish cousin, Mary Stuart, Elizabeth believed it in the best interests of the English
nation to forgo the naming of a successor. Her MPs thought otherwise; the tone of
their 1563 petition reflects a growing frustration with what they considered
Elizabeth’s imprudent policies.
Reaching beyond the traditional format of humble requests for the queen to
consider, the 1563 petition chastised Elizabeth by comparing her unfavorably to her
presumably wiser kingly predecessors. The petitioner declared, “all your Majestie’s
progenitors, kinges o f the realme, hath in this behalf ben so carefull that from the
Conquest to this present daye the realme was never left, as now it is, without a certein
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heire living and knowen to whome the crowne after the death of the prince shuld
*

appertein.”

187

In addition, the petitioner reminded Elizabeth how her grandfather,

Henry VII, had ended civil war and secured the Tudor line through marriage and the
#

production of heirs of his body.

1QO

By drawing these explicit comparisons, the

members of parliament hoped to convince Elizabeth to see what seemed to them the
obvious truth: England was in peril as long as the queen remained unwed and the
succession otherwise unsecured.
Elizabeth’s MPs did not stop at demonstrating the need for a named successor.
They also presumed to instruct Elizabeth on the right and wrong choices. Though
Elizabeth had displayed ostensible favoritism toward Mary Stuart, her MPs warned
against embracing a non-English candidate. They noted that “we have ben
admonished o f the great mallice o f your forein enemies, which even in your life time
have sought to transferre the right and dignity o f your crowne to a stranger.”189 The
better candidate, her councilors suggested, was Lady Catherine Grey, the one already
selected by Elizabeth’s “most noble father” with his “most princely and fatherly
zeale,” a zeal that Elizabeth had yet to demonstrate. Parliament’s explicit, almost
condescending advice to Elizabeth to follow her father’s dictates was a far cry from
the license they gave to Henry in allowing him to settle the succession in his last will
and testament.
As argued by de la Torre, the difference in this treatment stemmed from
Elizabeth’s gender. Parliament felt that as a woman, and one who seemed incapable
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o f understanding what was best for the nation, Elizabeth required extensive counsel to
reverse her inferior approach to the succession and adopt the superior policy
embraced by her male progenitors and male councilors. According to de la Torre, “in
spelling out the dangers to Elizabeth of remaining unwed and childless, o f favoring
her Stuart cousin, and ultimately, by explaining the course she should follow, MPs
were mitigating female monarchy in the uniquely English way Aylmer had envisioned
in his treatise.”190 Elizabeth’s response to her MPs’ petition is one that we have
already discussed. To defend against the obvious gender prejudices o f her councilors,
she described herself as possessing two bodies, the stronger o f which was masculine
and, as such, unaffected by feminine inferiority. She then tabled the matter of the
succession by appealing for “further advice.”191
One of Elizabeth’s MPs took seriously her call for additional counsel. During
the 1563 parliamentary session, John Hales wrote and distributed a treatise entitled A
Declaration o f the Succession o f the Crowne Imperiall o f England in which he sought
to advise both the queen and his fellow parliamentarians on the legal suitability of the
•
100
rival claimants for the succession.
He began his tract by explicitly refuting
Elizabeth’s wish to categorize the succession as a private matter o f state, declaring
that this important issue “concemeth the whole realme universally, and every one of
use particularly.”

1 QO

His tract was ultimately responsible for initiating a succession
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pamphlet war that raged between 1563 and 1566, in which English politicians very
publicly debated what the queen had wished to treat privately. No king had ever been
subject to such a torrent o f advice and often hostile criticism on the matter of his
succession. 194
But, as Hales asserted, no king had ever handled the issue o f the succession so
inadequately. Like the parliamentary petition of the same year, Hales implied that
Elizabeth was not living up to the reputations o f her male progenitors. Of her father,
Hales wrote, “King Henry so long time before (like a prudent Prince) forsaw the great
daunger, that the realme might fall in, for the uncertaynty o f the succession; and that
he had procured authority and power by parlayment to establish it... like a father of his
county, with good advisement and deliberation he made his will, and established the
succession.”195 While ostensibly praising Henry, this statement censured Elizabeth in
comparison. If her father was a “prudent prince” who listened to the “advisement” of
his parliament and “forsaw the daunger” of an unsettled succession, Elizabeth was
imprudent for not heeding her M P’s counsel to designate an heir during her lifetime.
Hales then proceeded to offer his opinion on whom Elizabeth should name.
Like the 1563 petition, he favored Catherine Grey and opposed Mary Stuart, but his
bold use o f legal arguments provided more than advice to the queen. They effectively
eliminated her choice in the matter. To Hales, the law allowed only a single claimant,
Catherine Grey, the one stipulated in parliamentary statute by Henry VIITs will; he
stated in no uncertain terms that Mary Queen of Scots was ineligible for the English
throne because o f her foreign status. He declared, “the Scottish Quene is not the
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kinge o f England’s child nor was borne in the kinge of England’s alleigaunce; nor yet
come o f father and mother in the faithe and alleigaunce of the king of England, nor is
a free-woman in England: wherefore by the lawes of England, she can not inherit in
the realme.”196 Though an imperial monarch, Hales thus implied that Elizabeth was
powerless to alter the succession because it had already been decided by law.
As if using the law to suspend her will were not enough o f an affront to
Elizabeth’s sovereignty, Hales procured foreign legal advice, to the effect that
Catherine Grey’s marriage to the earl of Hertford had indeed been legitimate. This
finding contradicted the ruling of Elizabeth’s ecclesiastical court and rendered
Catherine’s sons potential male heirs to the English throne. Though he reiterated
many o f the same arguments as the 1563 parliamentary petition, Hales had progressed
from advising to dictating to the queen on the issue o f the succession. His legal
conclusions indicated that both the queen’s alleged preference for Mary Stuart and the
judgments o f her courts were legally untenable.
Hales’ recourse to the law to limit Elizabeth’s sovereignty echoes Aylmer’s
claim that a female monarch was no threat to England because the law, not the
monarch ruled. Also like Aylmer, Hales considered female rulers less mete to make
wise decisions than their male counterparts. In his treatise, he baldly contended,
“because God first made man, and o f man woman; and hath also made him a more
apter instrument to serve in the common weale, in the functions both o f body and
mind; therefore is man preferred before the woman, and thought the more worthy
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person, not only by the lawes o f nature, but also by the lawes of this realm.”197
Though his reasoning sounds distinctly like Knox’s denunciation o f woman rulers,
Hales recognized the legitimacy of Elizabeth’s monarchy, and, like Aylmer, looked to
the law and the all-male counsel o f parliament to mitigate her queenship.
Hales began his tract with a description of the members o f parliament as the
“few chosen o f an infinite multitude to treat and do these things, that shall be for the
benefit of the commonweale, and be put in trust for the body o f the realme.”

10R

According to de la Torre, Hales’ statement, resonating with the language of conciliar
duty, demonstrates that he “believed parliament the rightful body to exercise the
governing power for the good o f the people.”199 Hales implied that if Elizabeth chose
Mary over Catherine, the only legal claimant by his logic, she would be committing
tyranny, and the power o f governance would devolve to parliament as the
representatives o f the people. He uttered this threat in the form o f the Latin phrase,
“Propter iniusticias et iniurias, transferretur regnum a gente in gentem.”200 In other
words, Hales believed that it was the duty of parliament to act, with or without the
queen, in the best interests of the nation, and to settle the succession on Catherine
who “we be bound by our Oaths and our laws to take.”201
In Hales’ vision o f the succession settlement, Elizabeth’s personal policies
were superseded by her M P’s duties to preserve the English. As de la Torre remarks,
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these are “bold words from a mere MP and clerk”202 that contain a radical conception
o f parliament’s counciliar role in the English monarchical state. In his tract, Hales
attempted to limit the queen’s sovereignty by narrowing her choices, encouraging
parliament to act on the succession if the queen would not do so, and establishing
parliament as the alternate seat of sovereignty if the queen made what he considered
the wrong choice on the succession. Elizabeth was so offended by his temerity that
Hales spent a year in the Tower and remained under house arrest for the rest of his
life.203
During the very same year in which Hales published his tract and parliament
presented its petition, another more significant councilor was devising a strategy to
solve the Elizabethan succession crisis by parliamentary means. Where Hales
suggested that parliament should settle the succession without the queen but provided
no tangible plan by which they could do so, William Cecil drafted a pragmatic bill
that would establish a parliamentary interregnum in the event o f Elizabeth’s demise
without heir. Long thought to be a loyal supporter of Elizabeth’s personal policies,
Cecil was in fact a conciliarist whose duties to preserve the state surpassed his
obligation to serve his queen, as John Guy and Stephen Alford have recently
argued.204 As Elizabeth’s closest advisor, he understood, perhaps better than anyone,
how difficult it would be to force Elizabeth’s hand on the succession. With this
present impasse in mind, he sought to ensure the stability of the realm after
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Elizabeth’s death. Cecil’s interregnum council would rule England in Elizabeth’s
stead until parliament could determine the appropriate heir. Through this solution,
Cecil hoped to prevent a lapse in royal authority which historically had led to civil
strife and a struggle for the throne.
Though this draft bill was never introduced in parliament, it provides a
window into Cecil’s conception o f the relationship between queen and parliament at
this crucial moment in Elizabeth’s reign. The radical logic underpinning the bill
suggested that parliament had the authority to separate imperial power from the
person o f the queen through statute. Rather than inhering to any particular candidate
upon Elizabeth’s death, Cecil’s clause proposed that her imperial body would reside
in a council o f state until such time as parliament determined the next monarch. In
effect, Cecil contended that through statute, parliament could divide the queen’s two
bodies.
As Guy asserts, this type o f argument could be viable only in reference to a
female monarch, for reasons we have already discussed.205 Elizabeth’s seeming
incapacity to understand the danger o f an unsettled succession had highlighted the
disparity between her womanly and monarchical bodies, allowing her councilors to
conclude “there was something more permanent than the life o f the physical body of
the queen.”206 As explained by Alford, “it was an admission that public or national
good could sometimes be defined in isolation from - even in direct opposition to - the
will o f an individual monarch.”207 Fueled by the rhetoric o f counsel and Elizabeth’s
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supposedly inferior gender, both Hales and Cecil envisioned a greatly enhanced,
independent role for parliament in English government, not as a permanent republican
substitute for monarchy, but as a solution to the succession crisis.
In the years between 1563 and 1566, and at parliament in 1566, other selfstyled male counselors reiterated many o f Hales’ and Cecil’s arguments in their
attempts to guide the wayward Elizabeth and galvanize parliament into establishing
the succession with or without the queen’s consent. In the tract entitled the Common
Cry o f Englishman made to the most Noble Lady, Queen Elizabeth and the High
Court o f Parliament, Richard Sampson delineated his vision o f the queen’s
inadequacies. According to Sampson, a radical Marian exile, Elizabeth was
untrustworthy, fickle, and timorous, negative characteristics commonly associated
with all women. She had failed to keep her 1563 promise that she would marry, was
seemingly unable to make a firm commitment to any one suitor, and thus far had been
too afraid to settle the great matter o f the succession. In sum, her natural, female
body had “gone astray.” Because Elizabeth had proven herself unable to act in the
best interests o f England, Sampson, like Hales and Aylmer before him, turned to the
men o f parliament to assuage her ineptitude. If monarchs should go astray, he
asserted, “then do not only wise councilors stand instead, but chiefly such great
assemblies of such persons so authorized and therewith privileged as parliament men
are.”

By suggesting parliament as an alternative authority to the wayward

Elizabeth, Sampson explicitly stated what Hales had implied. Not only could the
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queen not rule without her parliament, but “oftentimes [she should] be ruled by
them....”209
Reacting to the mounting body of writing that encouraged them to take
independent initiative on the succession, the Lords and Commons, comprising the
parliament o f 1566, agreed to take the unprecedented step o f introducing legislation
on the succession without the queen’s blessing. The speech that suggested this course
o f action contains familiar arguments asserting the public, not private, implications of
the succession, the peril o f the realm without a known successor, Elizabeth’s inability
to grasp political realities, and the duty of parliament to counsel or, if need be, coerce
the queen to establish the succession with all due speed. In a none-too-flattering
biblical metaphor, the petitioner suggested that the men o f parliament could no longer
claim that they had been seduced by Elizabeth, as Adam had by Eve, into endangering
the security o f the English nation. In the speaker’s words, “If we do protract it and
feigne this or that excuse, it will help us noe more then when Evah, when she had
eaten o f the forbidden fruite, to say the serpent had deceived her, or as Adam sayd,
‘the woman whome thou gavest me gave it unto me.”210 If they did not settle the
succession at this juncture, the petitioner implied, they would be no better than
Eve/Elizabeth, traitors to their duty to preserve the realm.
Eve was one o f the female biblical figures to whom Elizabeth had been
compared. The first figure, Deborah, had been employed by Aylmer to suggest that
Elizabeth was an exceptional female ruler just as Deborah had been one o f few
women to hold positions of leadership in the Bible. Through this comparison, he
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granted Elizabeth a certain amount o f agency to reign over the English nation so long
as she abided by the law and the advice of her counselors.211 As one pageant at her
coronation warned, however, this agency would be guaranteed only as long as she
continued to display her exceptional status. In 1563, Elizabeth’s failure to marry and
bear children tarnished her image as an exception to the rule, prompting parliament to
compare her to the more admirable Elizabeth o f the Bible who had passively and
joyfully accepted her duties as wife and mother. Thus, between 1559 and 1563,
Elizabeth’s subordinate womanhood had come more strongly to the fore,
overshadowing her identity as an independent, imperial ruler. By 1566, Elizabeth was
once again metaphorically portrayed as possessing agency, but this agency was
decidedly negative and inextricably connected to her allegedly weaker gender. One
member o f parliament implied that as the temptress Eve, Elizabeth had failed to
protect her nation’s interests, manipulating her male councilors into abiding by her
imprudent succession policies.
Though her MPs had emphasized the weaknesses of her natural body as a
descendant o f Eve, Elizabeth responded to her M P’s 1566 petition through allusion to
her male body politic. She compared herself to her noble father, declaring “thowghe I
be a woman yet I have as good a corage answerable to mye place as ever my fathere
hade. I wyll never be by vyolence constreyned to doo anye thynge.”

o1 'y

She then

lambasted the feet o f the body politic, parliament, for attempting to direct the head,
their monarch, thereby attempting to realign the relationship between Crown and
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parliament that was becoming dangerously close to a competition for control between
equals. These words were part of an address that Elizabeth delivered to a joint
council o f Lords and Commons, preemting their draft of the impending succession
bill. Through this speech, she deftly neutralizing the threat o f parliament’s
independent action, declaring that she would not be “by vyolence constreyned to doo
anye thinge.”
By 1571, however, Elizabeth finally conceded that the settlement o f the
succession was a matter to be decided by the queen-in-parliament. As stated in the
Treasons Act o f that year, anyone who denied that, “the lady Elizabeth, with and by
the authority o f the Parliament of England, is able to make laws and statutes of
sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown o f this realm” would be guilty
o f high treason.213 According to Mortimer Levine, this act indicated that “at long last
and no matter how reluctantly, Henry VIII’s precedents had been accepted by his
younger daughter.”214 In some ways, Levine’s assessment is true. Elizabeth had
admitted that parliament should play a legislative role in the succession as they had
during Henry’s reign. It was, however, Henry’s will to settle his succession in
parliament where Elizabeth preferred to treat the succession as a private matter o f her
arcana imperii. From this perspective, the relationship between Elizabeth and her
parliaments had moved well beyond Henry’s precedent. Henry’s parliaments
consented to his inconsistent succession acts, passively accepted his numerous wives,
and even bestowed Henry with the authority to alter the succession through his last
will and testament. Elizabeth was granted none of these privileges. Parliament
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consistently contested her preference to remain single and childless and actively
thwarted her desire to leave the succession unsettled. Turning to the all-male
parliament to mitigate Elizabeth’s queenship, men such as John Aylmer, John Hales,
Richard Sampson, and William Cecil respectively suggested that parliament should
limit Elizabeth’s sovereignty, initiate succession legislation on their own accord,
settle the succession without the queen, and by statute, transfer power to a council of
state in the even o f Elizabeth’s demise without heir.
Under a female monarch, the male members of parliament were no longer
silent partners in the process of government, but an active, masculine force ready to
challenge their female monarch’s policies if they were believed to threaten the
preservation o f the realm. Though Henry had been responsible for including
parliament in deciding the royal succession, Elizabeth’s gender and her apparently
inferior policies on the succession brought the Henrician contradiction to a head.
During the early part o f Elizabeth’s reign, political conflict raged between Crown and
parliament in which parliament’s assertive consilium diminished Tudor imperium.

213 Elizabeth I’s Second Treasons Act in Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 183.
214 Levine, Dvnastic Problems. 120.
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